Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (tiếng Ba Tư: ممدرضا پهلوی dịch. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi ; 26 tháng 10 năm 1919 - 27 tháng 7 năm 1980), [3] còn được gọi là Mohammad Reza Shah (ممدرضاشاه Mohamad Rezā Ŝāh), là người cuối cùng của Iran từ ngày 19 tháng 9 lật đổ bởi Cách mạng Iran vào ngày 11 tháng 2 năm 1979. Mohammad Reza Shah lấy danh hiệu Shahanshah ("Vua của các vị vua") [4] vào ngày 26 tháng 10 năm 1967. Ông là người thứ hai và cuối cùng quốc vương của nhà Pahlavi. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi đã nắm giữ một số chức danh khác, bao gồm cả Aryamehr ("Ánh sáng của người Aryan") và Bozorg Arteshtaran ("Tổng tư lệnh"). Ước mơ của anh ấy về cái mà anh ấy gọi là "Nền văn minh vĩ đại" (tiếng Ba Tư: تمننن 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 1945 hiện đại hóa quân sự, cũng như cải cách kinh tế và xã hội. [5]
Mohammad Reza lên nắm quyền trong Thế chiến II sau khi một cuộc xâm lược của Liên Xô-Anh buộc phải thoái vị cha mình, Reza Shah Pahlavi. Trong triều đại của Mohammad Reza, ngành công nghiệp dầu mỏ Iran đã bị quốc hữu hóa một thời gian ngắn, dưới thời Thủ tướng Mohammad Mosaddegh, cho đến khi một cuộc đảo chính do Mỹ và Anh hậu thuẫn đã phế truất Mosaddegh và đưa các công ty dầu khí nước ngoài trở về. Dưới triều đại của Mohammad Reza, Iran đã đánh dấu kỷ niệm 2.500 năm quân chủ Ba Tư liên tục kể từ khi thành lập Đế chế Achaemenid bởi Cyrus Đại đế - đồng thời với lễ kỷ niệm này, Mohammad Reza đã thay đổi chuẩn mực của lịch Iran từ thời bá đạo sang đầu Đế chế Ba Tư đầu tiên, được đo từ lễ đăng quang của Cyrus Đại đế. [7] Mohammad Reza cũng giới thiệu Cách mạng trắng, một loạt các cải cách kinh tế, xã hội và chính trị với mục đích tuyên bố biến Iran thành một cường quốc toàn cầu và hiện đại hóa quốc gia bằng cách quốc hữu hóa một số ngành công nghiệp và trao quyền cho phụ nữ.
Mohammad Reza dần mất đi sự ủng hộ từ các giáo sĩ Shi'a của Iran cũng như tầng lớp lao động, đặc biệt là do chính sách hiện đại hóa mạnh mẽ của ông, laïcité xung đột với tầng lớp thương nhân truyền thống được gọi là bazaari , quan hệ với Israel, và các vấn đề tham nhũng xung quanh mình, gia đình và giới cầm quyền. Nhiều chính sách gây tranh cãi khác đã được ban hành, bao gồm việc cấm Đảng Tudeh cộng sản và đàn áp chung về bất đồng chính trị của cơ quan tình báo Iran, SAVAK. Theo thống kê chính thức, Iran có tới 2.200 tù nhân chính trị vào năm 1978, một con số nhân lên nhanh chóng do cuộc cách mạng. [8]
Một số yếu tố khác góp phần chống lại Shah trong một số nhóm nhất định Trong Iran, trong đó quan trọng nhất là sự hỗ trợ của Hoa Kỳ và Vương quốc Anh cho chế độ của ông và đụng độ với phe cánh tả và Hồi giáo. Đến năm 1979, tình trạng bất ổn chính trị đã biến thành một cuộc cách mạng, vào ngày 17 tháng 1, buộc ông phải rời khỏi Iran. Ngay sau đó, chế độ quân chủ Iran đã chính thức bị bãi bỏ và Iran được tuyên bố là một nước cộng hòa Hồi giáo do Ruhollah Khomeini lãnh đạo. Đối mặt với khả năng bị xử tử nếu anh ta trở về Iran, anh ta đã chết lưu vong ở Ai Cập, mà tổng thống, Anwar Sadat, đã cho anh ta tị nạn. Do địa vị là Shah cuối cùng của Iran, anh thường được gọi đơn giản là "The Shah".
Thời niên thiếu [ chỉnh sửa ]
Sinh ra ở Tehran, với Reza Khan (sau này là Reza Shah Pahlavi) và người vợ thứ hai, Tadj ol-Molouk, Mohammad Reza là con trai cả của Reza Khan, người sau này trở thành Shah đầu tiên của triều đại Pahlavi, và là người thứ ba trong số mười một đứa con của ông. Cha của ông, một cựu Thiếu tướng của Lữ đoàn Cossack Ba Tư, là người gốc Mazandarani và Gruzia. [9] Cha của ông sinh ra ở Alasht, huyện Savadkuh, tỉnh Māzandarān. Bà ngoại của Mohammad Reza, Noush-Afarin, là một người nhập cư Hồi giáo từ Georgia (khi đó là một phần của Đế quốc Nga), [10] [11] gia đình của họ đã di cư sang Iran sau khi Iran bị buộc nhường lại tất cả các lãnh thổ của nó ở vùng Kavkaz sau Chiến tranh Nga-Ba Tư vài thập kỷ trước khi sinh của Reza Khan. [12] Mẹ của Mohammad Reza, Tadj ol-Molouk, là người gốc Ailen, sinh ra ở Baku, Đế quốc Nga (nay là Azerbaijan).
Mohammad Reza được sinh ra cùng với chị gái sinh đôi của mình, Ashraf. Tuy nhiên, Shams, Mohammad Reza, Ashraf, Ali Reza và chị gái cùng cha khác mẹ của họ, Fatimeh, không phải là hoàng tộc khi sinh ra, vì cha của họ đã không trở thành Shah cho đến năm 1925. Tuy nhiên, Reza Khan luôn bị thuyết phục rằng vận may đã bắt đầu vào năm 1919 với sự ra đời của đứa con trai được mệnh danh là khoshghadam (chim điềm lành). [13] Giống như hầu hết người Iran thời đó, Reza Khan không có họ và sau cuộc đảo chính Ba Tư năm 1921 đã phế truất Ahmad Shah Qajar, anh ta được thông báo rằng anh ta sẽ cần một cái tên cho ngôi nhà của mình. Điều này khiến Reza Khan thông qua một đạo luật yêu cầu tất cả người Iran lấy họ; ông đã chọn cho mình họ Pahlavi, đó là tên của tiếng Ba Tư (ngôn ngữ) mà chính nó có nguồn gốc từ tiếng Ba Tư cổ. [14] Trong lễ đăng quang của cha mình vào ngày 24 tháng 4 năm 1926, Mohammad Reza được tuyên bố là Thái tử. [15] [16]
Gia đình [ chỉnh sửa cha của anh ấy trong cuốn sách Mission for My Country là "một trong những người đàn ông đáng sợ nhất" mà anh ấy từng biết, miêu tả Reza Khan là một người đàn ông thống trị với tính khí hung bạo. [17] Một người lính cứng rắn, quyết liệt và rất tham vọng, người đã trở thành người Ba Tư đầu tiên chỉ huy Lữ đoàn Cossack ưu tú do Nga đào tạo, Reza Khan thích đá cấp dưới trong háng, những người không tuân theo mệnh lệnh của anh ta; Lớn lên dưới cái bóng của mình, Mohammad Reza là một cậu bé đầy vết sẹo và bất an, thiếu tự tin. [18] 
Mohamamd Reza với chị gái sinh đôi của mình, Ashraf Reza Khan tin rằng nếu cha họ thể hiện tình yêu của họ Các con trai, nó đã gây ra đồng tính luyến ái sau này trong cuộc sống, và để đảm bảo con trai yêu thích của mình là dị tính, đã từ chối anh ta bất kỳ tình yêu và tình cảm nào khi còn trẻ, mặc dù sau đó anh ta trở nên tình cảm hơn với Thái tử khi anh ta còn là một thiếu niên. [19] Reza Khan luôn gọi con trai mình là shoma ("thưa ngài") và từ chối sử dụng thêm không chính thức kéo ("bạn"), và đến lượt nó được con trai sử dụng cùng một từ [20] Nhà báo người Ba Lan Ryszard Kapuściński đã quan sát trong cuốn sách của ông Shah of Shahs khi nhìn vào những bức ảnh cũ của Reza Khan và con trai ông, ông đã bị ấn tượng bởi cách Reza Khan tự tin và xuất hiện trong bộ đồng phục của mình trong khi Mohammad Reza xuất hiện lo lắng và bồn chồn trong bộ đồng phục đứng cạnh cha. [21] Vào những năm 1930, Reza Khan là một người ngưỡng mộ Hitler, mặc dù điều này ít hơn vì bất kỳ sự phân biệt chủng tộc và chủ nghĩa bài Do Thái nào, nhưng vì Reza Khan đã xem Hitler như một người giống mình, cụ thể là một người đàn ông đã trỗi dậy từ một nền tảng không phân biệt để trở thành một nhà lãnh đạo đáng chú ý của thế kỷ 20. [22] Reza Khan thường gây ấn tượng với con trai, ông tin rằng lịch sử được tạo ra bởi những người vĩ đại như mình, và rằng một nhà lãnh đạo thực sự là một kẻ chuyên quyền. [22] Reza Khan là một người đàn ông ngực to và vạm vỡ, cao lớn hơn 6'4, khiến con trai giống như một ngọn núi, và trong suốt cuộc đời, Mohammad Reza bị ám ảnh bởi chiều cao và tầm vóc, ví dụ như đi giày thang máy. trông cao hơn so với thực tế của anh ta, thường tự hào rằng Núi Demavand cao nhất của Iran cao hơn bất kỳ đỉnh nào ở châu Âu hoặc Nhật Bản, và anh ta luôn bị thu hút nhất bởi phụ nữ cao. [23] Khi Shah, Mohammad Reza liên tục chê bai cha mình, gọi ông là một Cossack côn đồ, người chẳng đạt được gì như Shah, và đáng chú ý nhất là người con trai gần như đã gạt cha ra khỏi lịch sử trong triều đại của ông, đến mức ấn tượng được trao cho Nhà của Pahlavi bắt đầu sự cai trị của mình vào năm 1941 chứ không phải năm 1925. [24]
Gia đình hoàng gia Iran và Ai Cập sau đám cưới ở Cung điện Saadabad, Tehran Mẹ của Mohammad Reza, Tadj ol-Molouk cũng là một người phụ nữ quyết đoán. mê tín. Cô tin rằng giấc mơ là những thông điệp từ một thế giới khác, hy sinh những con cừu để mang lại may mắn và xua đuổi tà ma, và che chở cho những đứa con của mình bằng bùa hộ mệnh để tránh khỏi sức mạnh của con mắt độc ác. [25] Tadj ol-Molouk là người hỗ trợ tình cảm chính cho con trai cô, nuôi dưỡng niềm tin vào anh rằng định mệnh đã chọn anh vì những điều tuyệt vời, vì những người xoa dịu mà cô tham khảo đã giải thích giấc mơ của mình như chứng minh chính xác điều đó. [26] Mohammad Reza lớn lên được bao quanh bởi phụ nữ, vì những người có ảnh hưởng chính đến anh là mẹ anh, chị gái Shams và chị gái sinh đôi của anh, Ashraf, dẫn dắt nhà tâm lý học người Mỹ Marvin Zonis kết luận rằng đó là "... từ phụ nữ, và rõ ràng là từ phụ nữ "rằng Shah tương lai" "nhận được bất kỳ sự nuôi dưỡng tâm lý nào mà anh ta có thể có được khi còn nhỏ". [27] Theo truyền thống, trẻ em nam được coi là thích nữ hơn, và khi còn là một cậu bé, Mohammad Reza thường được chiều chuộng bởi mẹ và các chị gái của ông. [27] Mohammad Reza rất thân với chị gái sinh đôi Ashraf khi bà lưu ý: "Chính sự kết nghĩa này và mối quan hệ này với anh trai tôi sẽ nuôi dưỡng và duy trì tôi suốt thời thơ ấu. .. Dù tôi có vươn ra như thế nào trong những năm tới - đôi khi thậm chí tuyệt vọng - để tìm ra danh tính và mục đích của riêng mình, tôi sẽ vẫn gắn bó chặt chẽ với anh tôi ... luôn luôn, trung tâm của sự tồn tại của tôi là, và là, Mohammad Reza ". [28]
Sau khi trở thành Thái tử, Mohammad Reza được mẹ và các chị gái của mình đưa đi "giáo dục nam tính" bởi các sĩ quan do cha anh ta chọn, người cũng ra lệnh rằng mọi người kể cả mẹ và anh chị em của anh ta phải giải quyết Thái tử với tư cách là "Hoàng thân của bạn". [29] Kết quả của sự nuôi dưỡng của anh ấy giữa một người mẹ yêu thương, nếu sở hữu và mê tín và một người cha martinet hống hách là để biến Mohammad Reza thành lời của Zonis ".. - một chàng trai trẻ có lòng tự trọng thấp, che dấu sự thiếu tự tin, thiếu quyết đoán, thụ động, phụ thuộc và nhút nhát của anh ta với sự dũng cảm nam tính, bốc đồng và kiêu ngạo ", biến anh ta thành một người có mâu thuẫn rõ rệt như Vương miện Hoàng tử "vừa hiền lành vừa tàn nhẫn, rút lui và chủ động, phụ thuộc và quyết đoán, yếu đuối và mạnh mẽ". [30]
Giáo dục [ chỉnh sửa ]
Reza bước sang tuổi 11, cha anh đã hoãn lại ông đề nghị Abdolhossein Teymourtash, Bộ trưởng Bộ Tòa án, gửi con trai của ông đến Viện nghiên cứu Le Rosey, một trường nội trú Thụy Sĩ, để nghiên cứu thêm. Mohammad Reza rời Iran đến Thụy Sĩ vào ngày 7 tháng 9 năm 1931. [31] Vào ngày đầu tiên khi còn là sinh viên tại Le Rosey vào tháng 9 năm 1931, Thái tử đã đối kháng với một nhóm bạn học đang ngồi trên băng ghế trong công viên bên ngoài Le Rosey với yêu cầu tất cả họ phải chú ý khi anh đi ngang qua, giống như mọi người đã quay trở lại Iran, dẫn đến một sinh viên người Mỹ đánh đập Mohammad Reza, người nhanh chóng học cách chấp nhận rằng sẽ không có ai chú ý đến bất cứ nơi nào anh ta đến ở Thụy Sĩ. [32] Khi còn là học sinh, Mohammad Reza chơi bóng đá cạnh tranh, nhưng hồ sơ của trường cho thấy vấn đề chính của anh khi là cầu thủ bóng đá là "sự rụt rè" của anh vì Thái tử sợ phải mạo hiểm. [33] Thái tử được giáo dục bằng tiếng Pháp tại Le Rosey, và thời gian ở đó, ông đã rời Mohammad Reza với một tình yêu trọn đời với tất cả mọi thứ của Pháp. [34] Trong các bài báo ông viết bằng tiếng Pháp cho tờ báo sinh viên vào năm 1935 và 1936, Mohammad Reza đã ca ngợi Le Rosey vì đã mở rộng tâm trí và giới thiệu ông với nền văn minh châu Âu. [35] Mohammad Reza mất trinh tiết cho một người giúp việc làm việc tại Le Rosey vào năm 1935. [36]
Mohammad Reza là hoàng tử Iran đầu tiên lên ngôi để được giáo dục ở nước ngoài bốn năm tiếp theo trước khi trở về để lấy bằng tốt nghiệp trung học ở Iran vào năm 1936. Sau khi trở về nước, Thái tử đã được đăng ký tại học viện quân sự địa phương ở Tehran, nơi ông vẫn theo học cho đến năm 1938, tốt nghiệp Trung úy. Sau khi tốt nghiệp, Mohammad Reza nhanh chóng được thăng cấp bậc Thuyền trưởng, một cấp bậc mà anh giữ cho đến khi trở thành Shah. Trong thời gian học đại học, hoàng tử trẻ được bổ nhiệm làm Thanh tra Quân đội và dành ba năm đi khắp đất nước, kiểm tra cả cơ sở dân sự và quân sự. [15] [37]
Mohammad Reza nói tiếng Anh, tiếng Pháp và Tiếng Đức trôi chảy cùng với tiếng mẹ đẻ của mình là tiếng Ba Tư. [38]
Làm bạn với Perron [ chỉnh sửa ]
Trong thời gian ở Thụy Sĩ, Mohammad Reza kết bạn với Ernest Perron của một người làm vườn làm việc tại Le Rosey và người sẽ trở thành bạn thân nhất của anh ấy và là "anh em sinh đôi". [39] Perron, một người đàn ông lập dị, ẻo lả, ăn mặc theo phong cách trại, đi khập khiễng và ít che giấu đồng tính luyến ái, thường bị các học sinh đánh đập cho đến một ngày Mohammad Reza đến bảo vệ mình. [40] Perron, người tự cho mình là nhà thơ đã giới thiệu Mohammad Reza cho thơ Pháp và dưới ảnh hưởng của ông Chateaubriand và Rabelais đã trở thành "tác giả Pháp yêu thích" của ông. [36]
Thái tử thích Perron đến mức khi ông trở về Iran vào năm 1936, ông đã mang Perron trở lại với mình, cài đặt người bạn thân nhất của mình trong Cung điện cẩm thạch. [41] Perron sống ở Iran cho đến khi qua đời vào năm 1961 và là bạn thân nhất của Mohammad Reza là một người đàn ông có sức mạnh hậu trường đáng kể. [42] Sau Cách mạng Hồi giáo năm 1979, một cuốn sách bán chạy nhất đã được xuất bản bởi chế độ mới, Ernest Perron, Chồng của Shah của Iran của Mohammad Pourkian, cho rằng có mối quan hệ đồng tính giữa Shah và Perron, vẫn là cách giải thích chính thức tại Cộng hòa Hồi giáo cho đến ngày nay. [43] Zonis mô tả cuốn sách dài về những lời khẳng định và ngắn gọn về bằng chứng về mối quan hệ đồng tính giữa hai người, lưu ý rằng tất cả các triều thần của Shah đều phủ nhận rằng Perron là người yêu của Shah, và cho rằng Reza Khan, người rất đồng tính, sẽ rất đồng tính đã không cho phép Perron di chuyển vào Cung điện Ngũ Hành vào năm 1936 nếu ông tin rằng Perron là người yêu của con trai ông. [44]
Nhà sử học người Mỹ gốc Iran Abbas Milani cho rằng Perron là "đối tượng tự thân" của Mohammad Reza. người mà ai đó chọn đóng vai trò mở rộng tính cách của họ và củng cố lòng tự trọng của họ. [36] Milani lập luận rằng, theo cách mà người đàn ông Reza Khan thường tấn công con trai mình vì sự thiếu nam tính và nói rằng anh ta muốn con trai mình có một "nền giáo dục nam tính" để dạy cho anh ta một số machismo rằng Mohammad Reza dị tính để có một người đàn ông nhu nhược như Perron xung quanh đã xoa dịu những nghi ngờ về nam tính của chính anh ta. [45]
Triều đại đầu ] [ chỉnh sửa ]
Một trong những sáng kiến chính của chính sách đối ngoại của Iran và Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ là hiệp ước Saadabad năm 1937, một liên minh tập hợp Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ, Iran, Iraq và Afghanistan, với mục đích tạo ra một khối Hồi giáo hy vọng sẽ ngăn chặn bất kỳ kẻ xâm lược nào. Tổng thống Mustafa Kemal Atatürk của Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ đã đề nghị với người bạn Reza Khan trong chuyến thăm Thổ Nhĩ Kỳ sau đó rằng cuộc hôn nhân giữa tòa án Iran và Ai Cập sẽ có lợi cho hai nước và các triều đại của họ, vì điều đó có thể dẫn đến Ai Cập gia nhập hiệp ước Saadabad. [46] Theo đề nghị này, Mohammad Reza và Công chúa Fawzia đã kết hôn. Công chúa Dilawar Fawzia của Ai Cập (5 tháng 11 năm 1921 - 2 tháng 7 năm 2013), con gái của Vua Fuad I của Ai Cập và Nazli Sabri, là em gái của Vua Farouk I của Ai Cập. Họ kết hôn vào ngày 15 tháng 3 năm 1939 tại Cung điện Abdeen ở Cairo. [46] Reza Shah đã không tham gia vào buổi lễ. [46] Trong chuyến thăm Ai Cập, Mohammad Reza đã rất ấn tượng với sự hùng vĩ của triều đình Ai Cập khi ông đến thăm các cung điện khác nhau được xây dựng bởi Isma'il Pasha, còn được gọi là "Isma'il the Magnificent", Khedive nổi tiếng của Ai Cập, và giải quyết rằng Iran cần các cung điện để phù hợp với những người được xây dựng bởi Isma'il. [47]
Cuộc hôn nhân của Mohammad Reza với Fawzia đã sinh ra một đứa con, một cô con gái, Công chúa Shahnaz Pahlavi (sinh ngày 27 tháng 10 năm 1940). Cuộc hôn nhân của họ không hạnh phúc vì Thái tử công khai không chung thủy, thường được nhìn thấy đang lái xe quanh Tehran trong một trong những chiếc xe đắt tiền của anh ta với một trong những người bạn gái của anh ta. [48] Người mẹ thống trị và cực kỳ chiếm hữu của Mohammad Reza đã xem con dâu của mình là đối thủ với tình yêu của con trai mình, và đã làm nhục công chúa Fawzia, người có chồng với mẹ của mình. [48] Một người phụ nữ trầm tính, nhút nhát, Fawzia mô tả cuộc hôn nhân của cô là đau khổ, cảm thấy rất không mong muốn và không được gia đình Pahlavi yêu thương và khao khát quay trở lại Ai Cập. [48] Trong cuốn sách năm 1961 Mission For My Country Mohammad Reza đã viết "khoảnh khắc ánh sáng hạnh phúc duy nhất" trong toàn bộ cuộc hôn nhân của anh với Fawzia là sự ra đời của con gái anh. [49] cha [ chỉnh sửa ] Vào giữa Thế chiến II năm 1941, Đức Quốc xã bắt đầu Chiến dịch Barbarossa và xâm chiếm Liên Xô, phá vỡ Hiệp ước Rotoentrop của Molotov. Điều này có tác động lớn đến Iran, nước đã tuyên bố trung lập trong cuộc xung đột. [50] Vào mùa hè năm 1941, các nhà ngoại giao Liên Xô và Anh đã gửi nhiều tin nhắn cảnh báo rằng họ coi sự hiện diện của một số người Đức quản lý đường sắt nhà nước Iran là một mối đe dọa, ngụ ý chiến tranh nếu người Đức không bị cách chức. [51] Anh muốn gửi vũ khí cho Liên Xô thông qua đường sắt Iran, và những tuyên bố từ các nhà quản lý Đức về đường sắt Iran rằng họ sẽ không hợp tác khiến cả Moscow và London khăng khăng rằng người Đức Reza Khan đã thuê để điều hành tuyến đường sắt của mình phải bị sa thải một lần. [51] Là cố vấn thân cận nhất của cha mình, Thái tử Mohammad Reza không thấy phù hợp để nêu ra vấn đề về cuộc xâm lược của Anh-Xô có thể xảy ra với Iran, cam đoan với cha mình rằng sẽ không có chuyện gì xảy ra. [51] Nhà sử học người Mỹ Abbas Milani đã viết về mối quan hệ giữa Reza Khan và Thái tử: "Là bạn đồng hành liên tục của cha ông, hai người đã tham khảo ý kiến về hầu hết mọi quyết định". [52] Cuối năm đó Anh và Liên Xô các lực lượng chiếm đóng Iran trong một cuộc xâm lược quân sự, buộc Reza Shah phải thoái vị. [53] Vào ngày 25 tháng 8 năm 1941, các lực lượng hải quân của Anh và Úc đã tấn công Vịnh Ba Tư trong khi Liên Xô tiến hành một cuộc xâm chiếm đất liền từ phía bắc. Vào ngày thứ hai của cuộc xâm lược với lực lượng không quân Liên Xô ném bom Tehran, Mohammad Reza đã bị sốc khi thấy quân đội Iran đơn giản sụp đổ, với hàng ngàn sĩ quan và những người đàn ông kinh hoàng trên khắp Tehran cởi bỏ quân phục để đào ngũ và bỏ chạy bất chấp thực tế họ chưa thấy chiến đấu. [54] Phản ánh sự hoảng loạn, một nhóm các tướng lĩnh cấp cao của Iran đã gọi Thái tử để nhận được phước lành của mình để tổ chức một cuộc họp để thảo luận về cách tốt nhất để đầu hàng. [52] Khi Reza Khan biết về cuộc họp, anh ta đã nổi giận và tấn công một trong những vị tướng của mình, Ahmad Nakhjavan, tấn công anh ta bằng việc cưỡi ngựa, xé huy chương và chuẩn bị xử tử anh ta khi con trai anh ta thuyết phục anh ta để có tướng tòa án thay thế. [52] Sự sụp đổ của quân đội Iran vào mùa hè năm 1941 mà cha ông đã làm việc rất chăm chỉ để xây dựng sự sỉ nhục cho con trai ông, ông thề rằng ông sẽ không bao giờ thấy Iran bị đánh bại như vậy nữa, điều này giải thích nỗi ám ảnh về chi tiêu quân sự của Mohammad Reza. ] [54] 
Thăng thiên lên ngôi [ chỉnh sửa ]
Vào ngày 16 tháng 9 năm 1941 Forughi và Bộ trưởng Ngoại giao Ali Soheili đã tham dự một phiên họp đặc biệt của quốc hội để tuyên bố từ chức Reza Shah và Mohammad Reza sẽ thay thế ông. Ngày hôm sau, lúc 4:30 chiều, Mohammad Reza đã tuyên thệ nhậm chức và được các nghị sĩ tiếp đón nồng nhiệt. Trên đường trở về cung điện, những con đường đầy người chào đón Shah mới tưng bừng, dường như nhiệt tình hơn những gì quân Đồng minh mong muốn. [55] Người Anh muốn đưa Qajar trở lại ngai vàng, nhưng người yêu sách chính của Qajar lên ngôi là Hoàng tử Hamid Mirza, một sĩ quan trong Hải quân Hoàng gia không nói tiếng Ba Tư, vì vậy người Anh phải chấp nhận Mohammad Reza làm Shah. [56] Mối quan tâm chính của Liên Xô vào năm 1941 là đảm bảo sự ổn định chính trị để đảm bảo nguồn cung của Đồng minh, đồng nghĩa với việc chấp nhận ngai vàng. Sau khi trở thành vua, Iran đã trở thành một ống dẫn chính cho người Anh và sau đó, viện trợ của Mỹ cho Liên Xô trong chiến tranh. Nỗ lực cung cấp khổng lồ này được gọi là Hành lang Ba Tư. [57]
Phần lớn tín dụng cho việc chuyển giao quyền lực suôn sẻ từ Nhà vua sang Thái tử là do những nỗ lực của Mohammad Ali Foroughi. [58] Đau khổ vì đau thắt ngực, một Foroughi yếu đuối đã được triệu tập đến Cung điện và được bổ nhiệm làm thủ tướng khi Reza Shah sợ sự kết thúc của triều đại Pahlavi khi quân Đồng minh xâm chiếm Iran vào năm 1941. [59] Khi Reza Shah tìm kiếm sự giúp đỡ của mình để đảm bảo rằng quân Đồng minh sẽ không chấm dứt triều đại Pahlavi, Foroughi đã gạt bỏ những tình cảm cá nhân bất lợi của mình vì đã bị chính trị ngăn cản từ năm 1935. Thái tử hầu như không ngạc nhiên với Bộ trưởng Anh mà Foroughi "khó tin". mong đợi bất kỳ đứa con trai nào của Reza Shah trở thành một con người văn minh ", [59] nhưng Foroughi đã gạt bỏ thành công những suy nghĩ của quân Đồng minh để thực hiện một sự thay đổi mạnh mẽ hơn trong cơ sở hạ tầng chính trị của Iran. [60]
Một ân xá chung đã được ban hành hai ngày sau khi Mohammad Reza lên ngôi vào ngày 19 tháng 9 năm 1941. Tất cả các nhân cách chính trị đã chịu sự ô nhục trong triều đại của cha ông đã được phục hồi, và chính sách buộc phải khánh thành vào năm 1935 đã bị lật đổ. Bất chấp quyết định đã giác ngộ của vị vua trẻ, Bộ trưởng Anh tại Tehran đã báo cáo với Luân Đôn rằng "Shah trẻ nhận được sự chào đón khá tự phát về trải nghiệm công khai đầu tiên của mình, có lẽ là [due] để giải thoát cho sự mất tích của cha mình hơn là tình cảm công khai với chính mình ". Trong những ngày đầu làm Shah, Mohammad Reza thiếu tự tin và dành phần lớn thời gian với Perron viết thơ bằng tiếng Pháp. [61]
Năm 1942, Mohammad Reza gặp gỡ Wendell Willkie, ứng cử viên Đảng Cộng hòa cho Hoa Kỳ Tổng thống trong cuộc bầu cử năm 1940, người hiện đang tham gia chuyến công du thế giới để Tổng thống Roosevelt thúc đẩy chính sách "một thế giới" của mình; Willkie đưa anh ta bay lần đầu tiên. [62] Thủ tướng Ahmad Qavam đã khuyên Shah không nên bay cùng Wilkie, nói rằng ông chưa bao giờ gặp một người đàn ông nào có vấn đề đầy hơi nặng hơn, nhưng Shah đã nắm lấy cơ hội của mình. [62] Mohammed Reza nói với Willkie rằng khi anh ta bay, anh ta "muốn ở lại vô thời hạn". [62] Tận hưởng chuyến bay, Mohammad Reza đã thuê phi công người Mỹ Dick Collbarn dạy anh ta cách bay. Khi đến Cung điện cẩm thạch, Collbarn lưu ý rằng "Shah phải có hai mươi lăm chiếc xe được chế tạo riêng ... Buicks, Cadillac, sáu Rolls-Royces, một chiếc Mercedes". [63] Trong hội nghị Tehran năm 1943, Shah đã bị bẽ mặt khi gặp Joseph Stalin, người đã đến thăm anh ta trong Cung điện Ngũ Hành và không cho phép các vệ sĩ của Shah có mặt, với Hồng quân một mình bảo vệ Cung điện Ngũ Hành trong chuyến thăm của Stalin. [64]
Ý kiến về sự cai trị của cha mình [ chỉnh sửa ]
Mối quan hệ với người cha bị lưu đày của mình [ chỉnh sửa ]
Mohammad Reza bày tỏ mối quan tâm đối với người cha bị lưu đày của mình, người trước đây đã phàn nàn với thống đốc người Anh ở Mauritius. nhà tù khí hậu và xã hội. Theo dõi cuộc sống lưu vong của mình, Mohammad Reza sẽ phản đối việc cha anh đối xử với người Anh bất cứ lúc nào. Hai người đã gửi thư cho nhau, mặc dù việc giao hàng thường bị trì hoãn và Mohammad Reza đã ủy thác cho bạn mình, Ernest Perron, trao tận tay một thông điệp ghi âm về tình yêu và sự tôn trọng với cha mình, mang lại cho anh ta một bản ghi âm giọng nói của anh ta. [66]
Con trai yêu quý của tôi, kể từ khi tôi từ chức và rời khỏi đất nước tôi, niềm vui duy nhất của tôi là được chứng kiến sự phục vụ chân thành của bạn đối với đất nước của bạn. Tôi luôn biết rằng tuổi trẻ và tình yêu đất nước của bạn là nguồn sức mạnh to lớn mà bạn sẽ rút ra để đứng vững trước những khó khăn mà bạn gặp phải và bất chấp mọi rắc rối, bạn sẽ nổi lên từ thử thách này. Không một khoảnh khắc nào trôi qua mà tôi không nghĩ về bạn và điều duy nhất khiến tôi hạnh phúc và hài lòng là suy nghĩ rằng bạn đang dành thời gian phục vụ Iran. Bạn phải luôn luôn nhận thức được những gì diễn ra trong nước. Bạn không được khuất phục lời khuyên đó là tự phục vụ và sai. Bạn phải giữ vững và không đổi. Bạn không bao giờ phải sợ những sự kiện xảy ra theo cách của bạn. Bây giờ bạn đã gánh trên vai gánh nặng lớn này trong những ngày đen tối như vậy, bạn phải biết rằng cái giá phải trả cho một lỗi nhỏ nhất từ phía bạn có thể là hai mươi năm phục vụ và tên của gia đình chúng tôi. Bạn không bao giờ phải nhường cho sự lo lắng hoặc tuyệt vọng; thay vào đó, bạn phải giữ bình tĩnh và mạnh mẽ bắt nguồn từ vị trí của bạn đến nỗi không có sức mạnh nào có thể hy vọng di chuyển sự kiên định của ý chí của bạn. [67]
Shah trẻ [ chỉnh sửa ]
Năm 1945-46, vấn đề chính trong chính trị Iran là chính phủ ly khai do Liên Xô tài trợ ở Iran và Kurdistan, đã báo động rất nhiều về Shah . Ông đã nhiều lần đụng độ với thủ tướng Ahmad Qavam, người mà ông coi là quá thân Liên Xô. [68] Đồng thời, sự nổi tiếng ngày càng tăng của Đảng Tudeh cũng khiến Mohammad Reza lo lắng, người cảm thấy có khả năng đảo chính nghiêm trọng bởi Tudeh. [69] Vào tháng 6 năm 1946, Mohammad Reza cảm thấy nhẹ nhõm khi Hồng quân rút khỏi Iran. [70] Trong một lá thư gửi nhà lãnh đạo Cộng sản Ailen Ja'far Pishevari, Stalin tuyên bố rằng ông phải rút khỏi Iran vì nếu không người Mỹ sẽ không rút khỏi Trung Quốc, và ông muốn hỗ trợ Cộng sản Trung Quốc trong cuộc nội chiến chống lại Kuomintang. [71] Tuy nhiên, chế độ Pishevari vẫn nắm quyền lực ở Tabriz và Mohammad Reza đã tìm cách cắt xén những nỗ lực của Qavam để thỏa thuận với Pishevari như một cách để loại bỏ cả hai. [72] Vào ngày 11 tháng 12 năm 1946, Quân đội Iran do Shah lãnh đạo đã trực tiếp vào Iran của Iran và chế độ Pishevari sụp đổ với rất ít sự kháng cự, với hầu hết các cuộc giao tranh xảy ra giữa những người bình thường tấn công các chức năng của chế độ Pishevari đã hành xử tàn nhẫn. [73] Trong các tuyên bố của mình vào thời điểm đó và sau đó, Mohammad Reza đã ghi nhận thành công dễ dàng của mình ở Azerbaijan vào "sức mạnh thần bí" của mình. [74] Biết được xu hướng tham nhũng của Qavam, Shah đã sử dụng vấn đề đó như một lý do để sa thải anh ta. [75] Đến lúc này, Fawzia đã trở về Ai Cập, và mặc dù đã nỗ lực để vua Farouk thuyết phục cô trở về Iran nhưng cô đã từ chối, khiến Mohammad Reza phải ly dị cô vào ngày 17 tháng 11 năm 1947. [76]
Phi công có trình độ, Mohammad Reza rất thích bay và các chi tiết kỹ thuật của máy bay, bất kỳ sự xúc phạm nào đối với anh ta luôn là một nỗ lực để "cắt cánh của tôi". Mohammad Reza đã hướng nhiều tiền hơn cho Không quân Iran, hơn bất kỳ chi nhánh nào của lực lượng vũ trang, và đồng phục yêu thích của anh ta là Thống chế của Không quân Iran. [77] Zonis wrote that Mohammad Reza's obsession with flying reflected an Icarus complex, also known as "ascensionism", a form of narcissism based on "a craving for unsolicited attention and admiration" and the "wish to overcome gravity, to stand erect, to grow tall ... to leap or swing into the air, to climb, to rise, to fly ...".[78]
Besides an obsession with transcending gravity by flying, men with an Icarus complex tend to see women merely as sexual objects, which fitted in with Mohammad Reza, who was well known as a womaniser who often spoke of women as sexual objects who existed only to gratify him, which led to his celebrated 1973 exchange with Fallaci, who vehemently objected to his attitudes towards women.[79] As a regular visitor to the nightclubs of Italy, France and the United Kingdom, Mohammad Reza was linked romantically to several actresses including Gene Tierney, Yvonne De Carlo and Silvana Mangano.[80]
The young Shah was also the target of at least two unsuccessful assassination attempts. On 4 February 1949, he attended an annual ceremony to commemorate the founding of Tehran University.[81] At the ceremony, Fakhr-Arai fired five shots at him at a range of c. three metres. Only one of the shots hit the king, grazing his cheek. Fakhr-Arai was instantly shot by nearby officers. After an investigation, it was thought that Fakhr-Arai was a member of the Tudeh Party,[82] which was subsequently banned.[83] However, there is evidence that the would-be assassin was not a Tudeh member but a religious fundamentalist member of Fada'iyan-e Islam.[84][85] The Tudeh were nonetheless blamed and persecuted.[86]
The Shah's second wife was Soraya Esfandiary-Bakhtiari, a half-German half-Iranian woman and the only daughter of Khalil Esfandiary, Iranian Ambassador to West Germany, and his wife, the former Eva Karl. She was introduced to the Shah by Forough Zafar Bakhtiary, a close relative of Soraya's, via a photograph taken by Goodarz Bakhtiary, in London, per Forough Zafar's request. They married on 12 February 1951,[46] when Soraya was 18 according to the official announcement; however, it was rumoured that she was actually 16, the Shah being 32.[87] As a child she was tutored and brought up by Frau Mantel, and hence lacked proper knowledge of Iran, as she herself admits in her personal memoirs, stating, "I was a dunce—I knew next to nothing of the geography, the legends of my country, nothing of its history, nothing of Muslim religion."[88]
Oil nationalisation and the 1953 coup[edit]
By the early 1950s, the political crisis brewing in Iran commanded the attention of British and American policy leaders. In 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was appointed prime minister. He was committed to nationalising the Iranian petroleum industry controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) (as Anglo-Persian Oil Company or APOC had become).[89] Under the leadership of Mosaddegh and his nationalist movement, the Iranian parliament unanimously voted to nationalise the oil industry—thus shutting out the immensely profitable AIOC, which was a pillar of Britain's economy and provided it political clout in the region.[90]
At the start of the confrontation, American political sympathy was forthcoming from the Truman Administration.[91] In particular, Mosaddegh was buoyed by the advice and counsel he was receiving from the American Ambassador in Tehran, Henry F. Grady. However, eventually American decision-makers lost their patience, and by the time a Republican Administration came to office, fears that communists were poised to overthrow the government became an all-consuming concern; these concerns were later dismissed as "paranoid" in retrospective commentary on the coup from US government officials. Shortly prior to the 1952 presidential election in the United States, the British government invited CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt Jr., to London to propose collaboration on a secret plan to force Mosaddegh from office.[92] This would be the first of three "regime change" operations led by Allen Dulles (the other two being the successful CIA-instigated 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état and the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba).
Under the direction of Kermit Roosevelt Jr., a senior Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) officer and grandson of former US President Theodore Roosevelt, the American CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) funded and led a covert operation to depose Mosaddegh with the help of military forces disloyal to the government. Referred to as Operation Ajax,[93] the plot hinged on orders signed by Mohammad Reza to dismiss Mosaddegh as prime minister and replace him with General Fazlollah Zahedi, a choice agreed on by the British and Americans.[94][95][96][97]
Despite the high-level coordination and planning, the coup initially failed, causing the Shah to flee to Baghdad, and then to Rome. During his time in Rome, a British diplomat reported about a monarch who spent most of his time in nightclubs with Queen Soraya or his latest mistress: "He hates taking decisions and cannot be relied on to stick to them when taken. He has no moral courage and succumbs easily to fear".[98] To get him to support the coup, his twin sister Princess Ashraf, who was much tougher than him and publicly questioned his manhood several times, visited him on 29 July 1953 to berate him into signing a decree dismissing Mossaddegh.[99] After a brief exile in Italy, he returned to Iran, this time through a successful second attempt at a coup. A deposed Mosaddegh was arrested and tried. The king intervened and commuted the sentence to three years,[100] to be followed by life in internal exile. Zahedi was installed to succeed Mosaddegh.[101]
Before the first attempted coup, the American Embassy in Tehran reported that Mosaddegh's popular support remained robust. The Prime Minister requested direct control of the army from the Majlis. Given the situation, alongside the strong personal support of Conservative Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden for covert action, the American government gave the go-ahead to a committee, attended by the Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, Kermit Roosevelt, Henderson, and Secretary of Defense Charles Erwin Wilson. Kermit Roosevelt returned to Iran on 13 July 1953, and again on 1 August 1953, in his first meeting with the king. A car picked him up at midnight and drove him to the palace. He lay down on the seat and covered himself with a blanket as guards waved his driver through the gates. The Shah got into the car and Roosevelt explained the mission. The CIA bribed him with $1 million in Iranian currency, which Roosevelt had stored in a large safe – a bulky cache, given the then exchange rate of 1,000 rial to 15 dollars.[102]
The Communists staged massive demonstrations to hijack Mosaddegh's initiatives, and the United States actively plotted against him. On 16 August 1953, the right wing of the Army attacked. Armed with an order by the Shah, it appointed General Fazlollah Zahedi as prime minister. A coalition of mobs and retired officers close to the Palace executed this coup d'état. They failed dismally and the Shah decided to leave the country. Ettelaatthe nation's largest daily newspaper, and its pro-Shah publisher, Abbas Masudi, were against him, calling the defeat "humiliating".[103]
During the following two days, the Communists turned against Mosaddegh. Opposition against him grew tremendously. They roamed Tehran, raising red flags and pulling down statues of Reza Shah. This was rejected by conservative clerics like Kashani and National Front leaders like Hossein Makki, who sided with the king. On 18 August 1953, Mosaddegh defended the government against this new attack. Tudeh partisans were clubbed and dispersed.[104]
The Tudeh party had no choice but to accept defeat. In the meantime, according to the CIA plot, Zahedi appealed to the military, claimed to be the legitimate prime minister and charged Mosaddegh with staging a coup by ignoring the Shah's decree. Zahedi's son Ardeshir acted as the contact between the CIA and his father. On 19 August 1953, pro-Shah partisans – bribed with $100,000 in CIA funds – finally appeared and marched out of south Tehran into the city centre, where others joined in. Gangs with clubs, knives, and rocks controlled the streets, overturning Tudeh trucks and beating up anti-Shah activists. As Roosevelt was congratulating Zahedi in the basement of his hiding place, the new Prime Minister's mobs burst in and carried him upstairs on their shoulders. That evening, Henderson suggested to Ardashir that Mosaddegh not be harmed. Roosevelt gave Zahedi US$900,000 left from Operation Ajax funds.[105]
US actions further solidified sentiments that the West was a meddlesome influence in Iranian politics. In the year 2000, reflecting on this notion, US Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright stated:
In 1953 the United States played a significant role in orchestrating the overthrow of Iran's popular prime minister, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The Eisenhower Administration believed its actions were justified for strategic reasons; but the coup was clearly a setback for Iran's political development. And it is easy to see now why many Iranians continue to resent this intervention by America in their internal affairs.[106]
Mohammad Reza returned to power, but never extended the elite status of the court to the technocrats and intellectuals who emerged from Iranian and Western universities. Indeed, his system irritated the new classes, for they were barred from partaking in real power.[107]
The Shah asserts himself: from playboy to progressive[edit]
In the aftermath of the 1953 coup d'état, Mohammad Reza was widely viewed as a figurehead monarch, and General Fazlollah Zahedi, the Prime Minister, saw himself and was viewed by others as the "strong man" of Iran.[108] Mohammad Reza feared that history would repeat itself, remembering how his father was a general who had seized power in a coup d'état in 1921 and deposed the last Qajar shah in 1925, and his major concern in the years 1953–55 was to neutralise Zahedi.[109] American and British diplomats in their reports back to Washington and London in the 1950s were openly contemptuous of Mohammad Reza's ability to lead, calling the Shah a weak-willed and cowardly man who was incapable of making a decision.[109] The contempt in which the Shah was held by Iranian elites led to a period in the mid 1950s where the elite displayed fissiparous tendencies, feuding amongst themselves now that Mossadegh had been overthrown, which ultimately allowed Mohammad Reza to play off various factions in the elite to assert himself as the nation's leader.[109] The very fact that Mohammad Reza was considered a coward and something of an airhead turned out be an advantage as the Shah proved to be an adroit politician, playing off the factions in the elite and the Americans against the British with the aim of being an autocrat in practice as well in theory.[109] Supporters of the banned National Front were persecuted, but in his first important decision as leader, Mohammad Reza intervened to ensure most of the members of the National Front brought to trial such as Mosaddegh himself were not executed as many had expected.[110] Many in the Iranian elite were openly disappointed that Mohammad Reza did not conduct the expected bloody purge and hang Mosaddegh and his followers as they had wanted and expected.[110] In 1954, when 12 university professors issued a public statement criticising the 1953 coup, all were dismissed from their jobs, but in the first of his many acts of "magnanimity" towards the National Front, Mohammad Reza intervened to have them reinstated.[111] Mohammad Reza tried very hard to co-opt the supporters of the National Front by adopting some of their rhetoric and addressing their concerns, for example declaring in several speeches his concerns about the Third World economic conditions and poverty which prevailed in Iran, a matter that had not much interested him before.[112]
Mohammad Reza was determined to copy Mosaddegh, who had won popularity by promising broad socio-economic reforms, and wanted to create a mass powerbase as he did not wish to depend upon the traditional elites, who only wanted him as a legitimising figurehead.[113] In 1955, Mohammad Reza dismissed General Zahedi from his position as prime minister and appointed his archenemy, the technocrat Hossein Ala' as prime minister, whom he in turn dismissed in 1957.[114] Starting in 1955, Mohammad Reza began to quietly cultivate left-wing intellectuals, many of whom had supported the National Front and some of whom were associated with the banned Tudeh party, asking them for advice about how best to reform Iran.[115] It was during this period that Mohammad Reza began to embrace the image of a "progressive" Shah, a reformer who would modernise Iran, who attacked in his speeches the "reactionary" and "feudal" social system that was retarding progress, bring about land reform and give women equal rights.[116] Determined to rule as well as reign, it was during the mid 1950s that Mohammad Reza started to promote a state cult around Cyrus the Great, portrayed as a great Shah who had reformed the country and built an empire with obvious parallels to himself.[115] Alongside this change in image, Mohammad Reza started to speak of his desire to "save" Iran, a duty that he claimed he had been given by God, and promised that under his leadership Iran would reach a Western standard of living in the near future.[117] During this period, Mohammad Reza sought the support of the ulemaand resumed the traditional policy of persecuting those Iranians who belonged to the Baha'i faith, allowing the chief Baha'i temple in Tehran to be razed in 1955 and bringing in a law banning the Baha'i from gathering together in groups.[118] A British diplomat reported in 1954 that Reza Khan "... must have been spinning in his grave at Rey. To see the arrogance and effrontery of the mullahs once again rampant in the holy city! How the old tyrant must despise the weakness of his son, who allowed these turbulent priests to regain so much of their reactionary influence!".[118] By this time, the Shah's marriage was under strain as Queen Soraya complained about the power of Mohammad Reza's best friend Ernest Perron, whom she called a "shetun" (an insulting Persian term that translates roughly as a "piece of shit") and a "limping devil".[119] Perron was a man much resented for his influence over Mohammad Reza and was often described by enemies as a "diabolical" and "mysterious" character, whose position was that of a private secretary, but who was one of the Shah's closest advisors, holding far more power than his job title suggested.[36]
In a 1957 study done by the State Department, Mohammad Reza was praised for his "growing maturity" and no longer needing "to seek advice at every turn" as the previous 1951 study had concluded.[120] On 27 February 1958, a military coup to depose the Shah led by General Valiollah Gharani was thwarted, which led to a major crisis in Iranian-American relations when evidence emerged that associates of Gharani had met American diplomats in Athens, which the Shah used to demand that henceforward no American officials could meet with his opponents.[121] Another issue in American-Iranian relations was Mohammad Reza's suspicion that The United States was insufficiently committed to his defence, noting that Americans refused to join the Baghdad Pact, and military studies had indicated that Iran could only hold out for a few days in the event of a Soviet invasion.[122] In January 1959, the Shah began negotiations on a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, which he claimed to have been driven to by a lack of American support.[123] After receiving a mildly threatening letter from President Eisenhower warning him against signing the treaty, Mohammad Reza chose not to sign, which led to a major Soviet propaganda effort calling for his overthrow.[124] Khrushchev ordered Mohammad Reza assassinated.[125] A sign of Mohammad Reza's power came in 1959 when a British company won a contract with the Iranian government that was suddenly cancelled and given to Siemens instead.[126] An investigation by the British embassy soon uncovered the reason why: Mohammad Reza wanted to bed the wife of the Siemens sales agent for Iran, and the Siemens agent had consented to allowing his wife to sleep with the Shah in exchange for winning back the contract that he had just lost.[126] On 24 July 1959, Mohammad Reza gave Israel de facto recognition by allowing an Israeli trade office to be opened in Tehran that functioned as a de facto embassy, a move that offended many in the Islamic world.[127] When President Eisenhower visited Iran on 14 December 1959, he was told by Mohammad Reza that Iran faced two main external threats, the Soviet Union in the north and the new pro-Soviet revolutionary government in Iraq, which led him to ask for vastly increased American military aid, saying his country was a front-line state in the Cold War that needed as much military power as possible.[127]
The Shah and Soraya's controversial marriage ended in 1958 when it became apparent that, even with help from medical doctors, she could not bear children. Soraya later told the New York Times that the Shah had no choice but to divorce her, and that he was heavy-hearted about the decision.[128] However, even after the marriage, it is reported that the Shah still had great love for Soraya, and it is reported that they met several times after their divorce and that she lived her post-divorce life comfortably as a wealthy lady, even though she never remarried;[129] being paid a monthly salary of about $7,000 from Iran.[130] Following her death in 2001 at the age of 69 in Paris, an auction of the possessions included a three-million-dollar Paris estate, a 22.37 carat diamond ring and a 1958 Rolls-Royce.[131]
Pahlavi subsequently indicated his interest in marrying Princess Maria Gabriella of Savoy, a daughter of the deposed Italian king, Umberto II. Pope John XXIII reportedly vetoed the suggestion. In an editorial about the rumours surrounding the marriage of a "Muslim sovereign and a Catholic princess", the Vatican newspaper, L'Osservatore Romanoconsidered the match "a grave danger",[132] especially considering that under the 1917 Code of Canon Law a Roman Catholic who married a divorced person would be automatically, and could be formally, excommunicated.
In the 1960 U.S. elections, the Shah had favoured the Republican candidate Richard Nixon, whom he had first met in 1953 and rather liked, and according to the diary of his best friend Asadollah Alam contributed money to the 1960 Nixon campaign.[133] Relations with the victor of the 1960 election, the Democrat John F. Kennedy were not friendly.[134] In an attempt to mend relations after Nixon's defeat, Mohammad Reza sent General Teymur Bakhtiar of SAVAK to meet Kennedy in Washington on 1 March 1961.[135] From Kermit Roosevelt, Mohammad Reza learned that Bakhtiar, during his trip to Washington, had asked the Americans to support a coup he was planning, which greatly increased the Shah's fears about Kennedy.[136] On 2 May 1961, a teacher's strike involving 50, 000 people began in Iran, which Mohammad Reza believed was the work of the CIA.[137] Mohammad Reza had to sack his prime minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and give in to the teachers after learning that the Army probably would not fire on the demonstrators.[138] In 1961, Bakhtiar was dismissed as chief of SAVAK and expelled from Iran in 1962 following a clash between demonstrating university students and the army on 21 January 1962 that left three dead.[139] In April 1962, when Mohammad Reza visited Washington, he was met with demonstrations by Iranian students at American universities, which he believed were organised by U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who was the leading anti-Pahlavi voice in the Kennedy administration.[140] Afterwards, Mohammad Reza visited London. In a sign of the changed dynamics in Anglo-Iranian relations, the Shah took offence when he was informed he could join Queen Elizabeth II for a dinner at Buckingham Palace that was given in somebody else's honour, insisting successfully he would have dinner with the queen only when given in his own honour.[140]
Reza's first major clash with Ayatollah Khomeini took place in 1962 when Reza changed the local laws for swearing in members of municipal councils, to allow Iranian Jews, Christians, Zoroastrians, and Baha'i to take the oath of office using their holy books, instead of the Koran.[141] Khomeini wrote to the Shah to say this was unacceptable and that only the Koran could be used to swear in members of the municipal councils regardless of what their religion was, writing that he heard "Islam is not indicated as a precondition for standing for office and women are being granted the right to vote...Please order all laws inimical to the sacred and official faith of the country to be eliminated from government policies".[141] The Shah wrote back, addressing Khomeini as Hojat-al Islam rather than as Ayatollah, declining his request.[141] Feeling pressure from demonstrations organised by the clergy, the Shah withdraw the offending law, but it was reinstated with the White Revolution of 1963.[142]
Middle years[edit]
The Shah and his enemies[edit]
In 1963, Mohammad Reza launched the White Revolution, a series of far-reaching reforms, which caused much opposition from the religious scholars. They were enraged that the referendum approving of the White Revolution in 1963 allowed women to vote, with the Ayatollah Khomeini saying in his sermons that the fate of Iran should never be allowed to be decided by women.[143] In 1963 and 1964, nationwide demonstrations against Mohammad Reza's rule took place all over Iran with the centre of the unrest being the holy city of Qom.[144] Students studying to be imams at Qom were most active in the protests, and Ayatollah Khomeini emerged as one of the leaders, giving sermons calling for the Shah's overthrow.[144] At least 200 people were killed, with the police throwing some students to their deaths from high buildings, and Khomeini was exiled to Iraq in August 1964.[145]
The second attempt on the Shah's life occurred on 10 April 1965.[146] A soldier shot his way through the Marble Palace. The assassin was killed before he reached the royal quarters. Two civilian guards died protecting the Shah.[147]
According to Vladimir Kuzichkin – a former KGB officer who defected to the SIS – the Shah was also allegedly targeted by the Soviet Union, who tried to use a TV remote control to detonate a bomb-laden Volkswagen Beetle. The TV remote failed to function.[148] A high-ranking Romanian defector Ion Mihai Pacepa also supported this claim, asserting that he had been the target of various assassination attempts by Soviet agents for many years.
The Shah and his court[edit]
Mohammad Reza 's third and final wife was Farah Diba (born 14 October 1938), the only child of Sohrab Diba, a captain in the Imperial Iranian Army (son of an Iranian ambassador to the Romanov Court in St. Petersburg, Russia), and his wife, the former Farideh Ghotbi. They were married in 1959, and Queen Farah was crowned Shahbanu, or Empress, a title created specially for her in 1967. Previous royal consorts had been known as "Malakeh" (Arabic: Malika), or Queen. The couple remained together for twenty one years, until the Shah's death. Farah Diba bore him four children:
One of Mohammad Reza's favourite activities was watching films and his favourites were light French comedies and Hollywood action films, much to the disappointment of Farah who tried hard to interest him in more serious films.[149] Mohammad Reza was frequently unfaithful towards Farah, and his right-hand man Asadollah Alam regularly imported tall European women for "outings" with the Shah, though Alam's diary also mentions that if women from the "blue-eyed world" were not available, he would bring the Shah "local product".[150] Mohammad Reza had an insatiable appetite for sex, and Alam's diary has the Shah constantly telling him he needed to have sex several times a day, every day, or otherwise he would fall into depression.[151] When Farah found out about his affairs in 1973, Alam blamed the prime minister Amir Abbas Hoveyda while the Shah thought it was the KGB, and Milani noted neither admitted it was the Shah's "crass infidelities" that caused this issue.[151] Milani further wrote that "Alam, in his most destructive moments of sycophancy, reassured the Shah - or his "master" as he calls him - that country was prosperous and no one begrudged the King a bit of fun". He also had a passion for automobiles and aeroplanes, and by the middle 1970s, the Shah had amassed one of the world's largest collection of luxury cars and planes.[152] His visits to the West were invariably the occasions for major protests by the Confederation of Iranian Students, an umbrella group of left-wing Iranian university students studying abroad, and Mohammad Reza had one of the world's largest security details as he lived in constant fear of assassination.[153]
Milani described Mohammad Reza's court as open and tolerant, noting that his and Farah's two favourite interior designers, Keyvan Khosravani and Bijan Saffari, were openly gay, and were not penalised for their sexual orientation with Khosravani often giving advice to the Shah about how to dress.[154] Milani noted the close connection between architecture and power in Iran as architecture is the "poetry of power" in Iran.[155] In this sense, the Niavaran Palace, with its mixture of modernist style, heavily influenced by current French styles and traditional Persian style, reflected Mohammad Reza's personality.[154] Mohammad Reza was a Francophile whose court had a decidedly French ambiance to it.[156] However, when he commissioned a documentary from the French film-maker Albert Lamorisse meant to glorify Iran under his rule, he was annoyed that Lamorisse focused only on Iran's past, writing to Lamorisse there was no modern buildings in his film, which he charged made Iran look "backward".[157] Mohammad Reza's office was functional whose ceilings and walls were decorated with Qajar art.[158] Farah began collecting art and by the early 1970s owned works by Picasso, Gauguin, Chagall, and Braque, which added to the modernist feel of the Niavaran Palace[156]
Imperial coronation[edit]
On 26 October 1967, twenty-six years into his reign as Shah ("King"), he took the ancient title Shāhanshāh ("Emperor" or "King of Kings") in a lavish coronation ceremony held in Tehran. He said that he chose to wait until this moment to assume the title because in his own opinion he "did not deserve it" up until then; he is also recorded as saying that there was "no honour in being Emperor of a poor country" (which he viewed Iran as being until that time).[159]
2,500 year celebrations[edit]
As part of his efforts to modernise Iran and give the Iranian people a non-Islamic identity, Mohammad Reza quite consciously started to celebrate Iranian history before the Arab conquest with a special focus on the Achaemenid period.[160] At the celebration at Persepolis in 1971, the Shah had an elaborate fireworks show put on together with a sound and light show transmitted by hundreds of hidden loudspeakers and projectors intended to send a dual message; that Iran was still faithful to its ancient traditions and that Iran had transcended its past to become a modern nation, that Iran was not "stuck in the past", but as a nation that embraced modernity had chosen to be faithful to its past.[161] The message was further reinforced the next day when the "Parade of Persian History" was performed at Persepolis when 6,000 soldiers dressed in the uniforms of every dynasty from the Achaemenids to the Pahlavis marched past Mohammad Reza in a grand parade that many contemporaries remarked "surpassed in sheer spectacle the most florid celluloid imaginations of Hollywood epics".[161] To complete the message, Mohammad Reza finished off the celebrations by opening a brand new museum in Tehran, the Shahyad Aryamehr, that was housed in a very modernistic building and attended another parade in the newly opened Aryamehr Stadium, intended to give a message of "compressed time" between antiquity and modernity.[161] A brochure put up by the Celebration Committee explicitly stated the message: "Only when change is extremely rapid, and the past ten years have proved to be so, does the past attain new and unsuspected values worth cultivating", going on to say the celebrations were held because "Iran has began to feel confident of its modernization".[161] Milani noted it was sign of the liberalization of the middle years of Mohammad Reza's reign that Hussein Amanat, the architect who designed the Shahyad was a young Baha'i from a middle-class family who did not belong to the "thousand families" that traditionally dominated Iran, writing that it only in this moment in Iranian history that this was possible.[162]
Economy[edit]
In the 1970s, Iran had an economic growth rate equal to that of South Korea, Turkey and Taiwan, and Western journalists all regularly predicated that Iran would become a First World nation within the next generation.[163] Significantly, a "reverse brain drain" had begun with Iranians who had been educated in the West returning home to take up positions in government and business.[164] The firm of Iran National ran by the Khayami brothers had become by 1978 the largest automobile manufacturer in the Middle East producing 136,000 cars every year while employing 12,000 people in Meshed.[165] One of the Khayami brothers complained if had not been for the revolution "Iran National would be where the South Korean car industry is today".[164] Mohammad Reza had strong etatist tendencies and was deeply involved in the economy with his economic policies bearing a strong resemblance to the same etatist policies being pursued by General Park Chung-hee in South Korea at the same time.[164] Mohammad Reza considered himself to be a socialist, saying he was "more socialist and revolutionary than anyone".[164] Reflecting his self-proclaimed socialist tendencies, though unions were illegal, but the Shah brought in labour laws that were "surprising fair to workers".[166] Iran in the 1960s and 70s was a tolerant place for the Jewish minority with one Iranian Jew, David Menasheri, remembering that Mohammad Reza's reign was the "golden age" for Iranian Jews when they were equals, and when the Iranian Jewish community was one of the wealthiest Jewish communities in the world.[167] The Baha'i minority also did well after the bout of persecution in the mid-1950s ended with several Baha'i families becoming prominent in world of Iranian business.[168]
Foreign relations[edit]
In 1961, the Francophile Mohammad Reza visited Paris to meet his favourite leader, General Charles de Gaulle of France.[169] Mohammad Reza saw height as the measure of a man and a woman (the Shah had a marked preference for tall women) and the 6'5 de Gaulle was his most admired leader.[169] Mohammad Reza loved to be compared to his "ego ideal" of General de Gaulle, and his courtiers constantly flattered him by calling him Iran's de Gaulle.[169] During the French trip, Queen Farah, who shared her husband's love of French culture and language, befriended the culture minister André Malraux, who arranged for the exchange of cultural artifacts between French and Iranian museums and art galleries, a policy that remained a key component of Iran's cultural diplomacy until 1979.[170] Many of the legitimising devices of the regime such as the constant use of referendums were modelled after de Gaulle's regime.[170] Intense Francophiles, Mohammad Reza and Farah preferred to speak French rather than Persian to their children.[171] Mohammad Reza built the Niavaran Palace which took up 9, 000 square feet and whose style was a blend of Persian and French architecture.[172]
The Shah's diplomatic foundation was the United States' guarantee that it would protect him, which was what enabled him to stand up to larger enemies. While the arrangement did not preclude other partnerships and treaties, it helped to provide a somewhat stable environment in which Mohammad Reza could implement his reforms. Another factor guiding Mohammad Reza in his foreign policy was his wish for financial stability which required strong diplomatic ties. A third factor in his foreign policy was his wish to present Iran as a prosperous and powerful nation; this fuelled his domestic policy of Westernisation and reform. A final component was his promise that communism could be halted at Iran's border if his monarchy was preserved. By 1977, the country's treasury, the Shah's autocracy, and his strategic alliances seemed to form a protective layer around Iran.[173]
Although the U.S. was responsible for putting the Shah in power, he did not always act as a close U.S. ally. In the early 1960s, when a policy planning staff that included William R. Polk encouraged the Shah to distribute Iran's growing revenues more equitably, slow the rush toward militarisation, and open the government to political processes, he became furious and identified Polk as "the principal enemy of his regime." In July 1964, the Shah, Turkish President Cemal Gürsel and Pakistani President Ayub Khan announced in Istanbul the establishment of the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) organisation to promote joint transportation and economic projects. It also envisioned Afghanistan's joining at some time in the future. The Shah of Iran was the first regional leader to recognise the State of Israel as a de facto state, although when interviewed on 60 Minutes by reporter Mike Wallace, he criticised American Jews for their presumed control over U.S. media and finance.[174] In a 1967 memo to President Lyndon Johnson, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara wrote that "our sales [to Iran] have created about 1.4 million man-years of employment in the U.S. and over $1 billion in profits to American industry over the last five years", which led McNamara to conclude that Iran was an arms market the United States could not do without.[175] In June 1965, after the Americans proved reluctant to sell Mohammad Reza some of the weapons he asked for, the Shah visited Moscow where the Soviets agreed to sell some $110 million worth of weaponry; the threat of Iran pursuing the "Soviet option" caused the Americans to give in on selling Iran weapons.[175] Additionally, British, French and Italian arms firms were willing to sell Iran weapons, thus giving Mohammad Reza considerable leverage in his talks with the Americans, who sometimes worried that the Shah was buying more weapons than Iran needed or could handle.[175]
Concerning the fate of Bahrain (which Britain had controlled since the 19th century, but which Iran claimed as its own territory) and three small Persian Gulf islands, the Shah negotiated an agreement with the British, which, by means of a public consensus, ultimately led to the independence of Bahrain (against the wishes of Iranian nationalists). In return, Iran took full control of Greater and Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa in the Strait of Hormuz, three strategically sensitive islands which were claimed by the United Arab Emirates. During this period, the Shah maintained cordial relations with the Persian Gulf states and established close diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia. Mohammad Reza saw Iran as the natural dominant power in the Persian Gulf region, and that no challenges to Iranian hegemony would be tolerated, a claim that was supported by a gargantuan arms-buying spree that started in the early 1960s.[176] Mohammad Reza supported the Yemeni royalists against republican forces in the Yemen Civil War (1962–70) and assisted the sultan of Oman in putting down a rebellion in Dhofar (1971). In 1971, Mohammad Reza told a journalist: "World events were such that we were compelled to accept the fact that sea adjoining the Oman Sea--I mean the Indian Ocean--does not recognise borders. As for Iran's security limits--I will not state how many kilometers we have in mind, but anyone who is acquainted with geography and the strategic situation, and especially with the potential air and sea forces, know what distances from Chah Bahar this limit can reach".[177]
Relations with Iraq, however, were often difficult due to political instability in the latter country. Mohammad Reza was distrustful of both the Socialist government of Abd al-Karim Qasim and the Arab nationalist Baath party. Mohammad Reza resented the internationally recognised border on the Shatt al-Arab river, which in a 1937 treaty fixed the border on the low watermark on the Iranian side, giving Iraq control of most of the Shatt al-Arab.[178] On 19 April 1969, Mohammad Reza abrogated the 1937 Iranian-Iraqi treaty over control of the Shatt al-Arab, and as a result Iran ceased paying tolls to Iraq when its ships used the Shatt al-Arab, costing Iraq a lucrative source of income.[179] He justified his move by arguing that almost all river borders all over the world ran along the thalweg (deep channel mark), and by claiming that because most of the ships that used the Shatt al-Arab were Iranian, the 1937 treaty was unfair to Iran.[180] Iraq threatened war over the Iranian move, but when on 24 April 1969 an Iranian tanker escorted by Iranian warships sailed down the Shatt al-Arab without paying tolls, Iraq, being the militarily weaker state, did nothing.[181] The Iranian abrogation of the 1937 treaty marked the beginning of a period of acute Iraqi-Iranian tension that was to last until the Algiers Accords of 1975.[181] The fact that Iraq had welcomed the former SAVAK chief General Teymur Bakhtiar to Baghdad where he regularly met with representatives of the Tudeh Party and the Confederation of Iranian Students added to the difficult relations between Iran and Iraq.[182] On 7 August 1970, Bakhtiar was badly wounded by a SAVAK assassin who shot him five times, and he died five days later; Alam wrote in his diary that Mohammad Reza rejoiced at the news.[183]
On 7 May 1972, Mohammad Reza told a visiting President Richard Nixon that the Soviet Union was attempting to dominate the Middle East via its close ally Iraq, and to check Iraqi ambitions would also be to check Soviet ambitions.[184] Nixon agreed to support Iranian claims to have the thalweg in the Shatt al-Arab as the border and to generally back Iran in its confrontation with Iraq.[184] Mohammad Reza financed Kurdish separatist rebels in Iraq, and to cover his tracks, armed them with Soviet weapons which Israel had seized from Soviet-backed Arab regimes, and then handed over to Iran at the Shah's behest. The initial operation was a disaster, but the Shah continued attempts to support the rebels and weaken Iraq. Then in 1975, the countries signed the Algiers Accord, which granted Iran equal navigation rights in the Shatt al-Arab river as the thalweg was now the new border, while Mohammad Reza agreed to end his support for Iraqi Kurdish rebels.[185] The Shah also maintained close relations with King Hussein of Jordan, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and King Hassan II of Morocco.[186] Starting in 1970, Mohammad Reza formed an unlikely alliance with the militantly left-wing regime of Colonel Qaddhafi of Libya as both leaders wanted higher oil prices for their nations, leading to Iran and Libya joining forces to press for the "leapfrogging" of oil prices.[187]
The U.S.-Iran relationship grew more contentious as the U.S. became more dependent on Reza to be a stabilising force in the Middle East. In a July 1969 visit to Guam, President Richard Nixon had announced the Nixon Doctrine, which declared that the United States would honour its treaty commitments in Asia, but "as far as the problems of international security are concerned ... the United States is going to encourage and has a right to expect that this problem will increasingly be handled by, and the responsibility for it taken by, the Asian nations themselves".[175] The particular Asian nation the Nixon Doctrine was aimed at was South Vietnam, but Mohamed Reza seized upon the Nixon Doctrine with its message that Asian nations should be responsible for their own defence to argue that the Americans should sell him arms without limitation, a suggestion that Nixon embraced.[175] A particular dynamic was established in American-Iranian relations from 1969 onward in which the Americans gave in to whatever Mohammad Reza demanded, as they felt they needed a strong Iran as a pro-American force in the Middle East and could not afford to lose Iran as an ally.[188] Further adding to the Shah's confidence was the Sino-Soviet war of 1969, which forced the Red Army to make a major redeployment to the Chinese border.[189] Mohammad Reza, who always feared the prospect of a Soviet invasion, welcomed the Sino-Soviet war and the resulting reduction of Red Army divisions along the Soviet-Iranian border as giving him more room internationally.[189]
Under Nixon, the United States finally agreed to sever all contact with any Iranians opposed to the Shah's regime, a concession that Mohammad Reza had been seeking since 1958.[183] The often very anti-American tone of the Iranian press was ignored because Mohammad Reza supported the United States in the Vietnam War and likewise the Americans ignored the Shah's efforts to raise oil prices, despite the fact it cost many American consumers more.[188] After 1969, a process of "reverse leverage" set in when Mohammad Reza began to dictate to the United States as the Americans needed him more than he needed the Americans.[190] The American National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger wrote because of the Vietnam War, it was not politically possible in the 1970s for the United States to fight a major war, writing in 1982: "There was no possibility of assigning any American forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst of the Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such commitment; the public would not have supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to play this role".[190] As such, the Americans needed Iran as an ally very badly, which allowed Mohammad Reza to dictate to them, an experience that greatly boosted his ego, as he felt he was able to impose his will on the world's most powerful nation.[190]
The Americans initially rejected Mohammad Reza's suggestion that they join him in supporting the Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga fighting for independence on the grounds that an independent Kurdistan would inspire the Turkish Kurds to rebel, and they had no interest in antagonising the NATO member Turkey.[184] Some of the Shah's advisers also felt it was unwise to support the peshmergasaying that if the Iraqi Kurds won independence, then the Iranian Kurds would want to join them. When Nixon and Kissinger visited Tehran in May 1972, the Shah convinced them to take a larger role in what had, up to then, been a mainly Israeli-Iranian operation to aid Iraqi Kurds in their struggles against Iraq, against the warnings of the CIA and State Department that the Shah would ultimately betray the Kurds. He did this in March 1975 with the signing of the Algiers Accord that settled Iraqi-Iranian border disputes, an action taken without prior consultation with the U.S., after which he cut off all aid to the Kurds and prevented the U.S. and Israel from using Iranian territory to provide them assistance.[191] As way of increasing pressure on Baghdad, the peshmerga had been encouraged by Iran and the U.S. to abandon guerrilla war for conventional war in April 1974, so the years 1974-75 saw the heaviest fighting between the Iraqi Army and the peshmerga. The sudden cut-off of Iranian support in March 1975 left the Kurds very exposed, causing them to be crushed by Iraq.[192] The British journalist Patrick Brogan wrote that "...the Iraqis celebrated their victory in the usual manner, by executing as many of the rebels as they could lay their hands on".[192] Kissinger later wrote in his memoirs that it was never the intention of the U.S. or Iran to see the peshmerga actually win, as an independent Kurdistan would have created too many problems for both Turkey and Iran; rather the intention was to "irritate" Iraq enough to force the Iraqis to change their foreign policy.[184]
The Shah also manipulated America's dependence on Middle Eastern oil; although Iran did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo, he purposely increased production in its aftermath to capitalise on the higher prices. In December 1973, only two months after oil prices were raised by 70 per cent, he urged OPEC nations to push prices even higher, which they agreed to and more than doubled the price. Oil prices increased 470 per cent over a 12-month period, which also increased Iran's GDP by 50 per cent. Despite personal pleas from President Richard Nixon, the Shah ignored any complaints, claimed the U.S. was importing more oil than any time in the past, and proclaimed that "the industrial world will have to realise that the era of their terrific progress and even more terrific income and wealth based on cheap oil is finished."[191]
Modernisation and evolution of government[edit]
With Iran's great oil wealth, the Shah became the preeminent leader of the Middle East, and self-styled "Guardian" of the Persian Gulf. In 1961 he defended his style of rule, saying "When Iranians learn to behave like Swedes, I will behave like the King of Sweden."[194]
During the last years of his regime, the Shah's government became more autocratic. In the words of a U.S. Embassy dispatch, "The Shah's picture is everywhere. The beginning of all film showings in public theaters presents the Shah in various regal poses accompanied by the strains of the National Anthem ... The monarch also actively extends his influence to all phases of social affairs ... there is hardly any activity or vocation in which the Shah or members of his family or his closest friends do not have a direct or at least a symbolic involvement. In the past, he had claimed to take a two-party system seriously and declared, 'If I were a dictator rather than a constitutional monarch, then I might be tempted to sponsor a single dominant party such as Hitler organised'".[195]
However, by 1975 he had abolished the two-party system of government in favour of a one-party state under the Rastakhiz (Resurrection) Party. This was the merger of the New Iran Party,[196] a centre-right party, and the People's Party,[197] a liberal party. The Shah justified his actions by declaring: "We must straighten out Iranians' ranks. To do so, we divide them into two categories: those who believe in Monarchy, the constitution and the Six Bahman Revolution and those who don't ... A person who does not enter the new political party and does not believe in the three cardinal principles will have only two choices. He is either an individual who belongs to an illegal organisation, or is related to the outlawed Tudeh Party, or in other words a traitor. Such an individual belongs to an Iranian prison, or if he desires he can leave the country tomorrow, without even paying exit fees; he can go anywhere he likes, because he is not Iranian, he has no nation, and his activities are illegal and punishable according to the law".[198] In addition, the Shah had decreed that all Iranian citizens and the few remaining political parties become part of Rastakhiz.[199]
The image and self-image of Mohammad Reza in the 1970s[edit]
By the 1970s, Mohammad Reza was considered one of the world's most successful and able leaders.[by whom?] From 1973 onward, Mohammad Reza had proclaimed his aim as that of the tamaddon-e-bozorgthe "Great Civilisation", a turning point not only in Iran's history, but also the history of the entire world, a claim that was taken seriously for a time in the West.[200] On 2 December 1974, the New Yorker magazine published an article by Paul Erdman that was a conjectural future history entitled "The Oil War of 1976: How The Shah Won the World: The World as We Knew It Came to an End When the Shah Of Iran Decided to Restore The Glory of Ancient Persia with Western Arms".[201] In 1975, the Vice President of the United States Nelson Rockefeller declared in a speech: "We must take His Imperial Majesty to the United States for a couple of years so that he can teach us how to run a country".[202] In 1976 a pulp novel by Alan Williams was published in the United States under the title A Bullet for the Shah: All They Had To Do Was Kill the World's Most Powerful Manwhose sub-title reveals much about how the American people viewed the Shah at the time (the original British title was the more prosaic Shah-Mak).[201]
The great wealth generated by Iran's oil encouraged a sense of nationalism at the Imperial Court. The Empress Farah recalled of her days as a university student in 1950s France about being asked where she was from:
When I told them Iran ... the Europeans would recoil in horror as if Iranians were barbarians and loathsome. But after Iran became wealthy under the Shah in the 1970s, Iranians were courted everywhere. Yes, Your Majesty. Of course, Your Majesty. If you please, Your Majesty. Fawning all over us. Greedy sycophants. Then they loved Iranians.[203]
Mohammad Reza shared the Empress's sentiments as Westerners came begging to his court looking for his largess, leading him to remark in 1976:
Now we are the masters and our former masters are our slaves. Everyday they a beat a track to our door begging for favors. How can they be of assistance? Do we want arms? Do we want nuclear power stations? We have only to answer, and they will fulfill our wishes[203]
Because the House of Pahlavi were a parvenu house as Reza Khan had begun his career as a private in the Persian Army, rising up to the rank of general, taking power in a coup d'état in 1921, and making himself Shah in 1925, Mohammad Reza was keen to gain the approval of the older royal families of the world, and was prepared to spend large sums of money to gain that social acceptance.[204]
Amongst the royalty that came to Tehran looking for generosity from a Shah known for his lavish spending were King Hussein of Jordan, the former King Constantine II of Greece, King Hassan II of Morocco, the princes and princesses of the Dutch House of Orange and the Italian Princess Maria Gabriella of Savoy, whom the Shah had once courted in the 1950s.[204] He coveted the British Order of the Garter, and had, prior to courting Maria Gabriella, inquired about marrying Princess Alexandra of Kent, granddaughter of King George V, but in both cases he was rebuffed in no uncertain terms.[205] As an Iranian, Mohammad Reza greatly enjoyed supporting the Greek branch of the House of Glücksburg, knowing the Greeks still celebrated their victories over the Persians in the 5th and 4th centuries BC.[204] He enjoyed close relations with Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, as demonstrated by the fact that he was the guest of honour at the Persepolis celebrations in 1971. Ethiopia and Iran, along with Turkey and Israel, were envisioned as an "alliance of the periphery" that would constrain Arab power in the greater Middle East.
In an era of high oil prices, Iran's economy boomed while the economies of the Western nations after the oil shock of 1973–74 were trapped in stagflation (economic stagnation and inflation), which seemed to prove the greatness of Mohammad Reza both to himself and to the rest of the world.[206] In 1975, both the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and the French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing made pleading phone calls to Mohammad Reza, asking him for loans, which ultimately led the Shah to give a $1 billion US loan to the United Kingdom and another $1 billion US to France.[206] In a TV speech in January 1975 explaining why he was lending Britain a sum equal to $1 billion US dollars, Mohammad Reza declared in his usual grandiose style: "I have known the most dark hours when our country was obliged to pass under the tutelage of foreign powers, amongst them England. Now I find that England has not only become our friend, our equal, but also the nation to which, should we be able, we will render assistance with pleasure", going on to say that since he "belonged to this [European] world", he did not want Europe to collapse economically.[206] As Britain had often dominated Iran in the past, the change in roles was greatly gratifying to Mohammad Reza.[206]
The courtiers of the Shah's court were devoted to stroking his ego, competing about who could be the most sycophantic, with Mohammad Reza being regularly assured he was a greater leader than his much admired General de Gaulle, that democracy was doomed, and based on Rockefeller's speech that the American people wanted Mohammad Reza to be their leader, as well as doing such a great job as Shah of Iran.[202] All of this praise boosted Mohammad Reza's ego, and he went from being a merely narcissistic man to a megalomaniac, believing himself a man chosen by Allah Himself to transform Iran and create the "Great Civilisation".[201][202] When one of the Shah's courtiers suggested launching a campaign to award him the Nobel Peace Prize, he wrote on the margin: "If they beg us, we might accept. They give the Nobel to kaka siah ["any black face"] these days. Why should we belittle ourselves with this?"[207] Befitting all this attention and praise, Mohammad Reza started to make increasingly outlandish claims for the "Great Civilisation", telling the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci in a 1973 interview:
Halfway measures, compromises, are unfeasible. In other words, either one is a revolutionary or one demands law and order. One can't be a revolutionary with law and order. And even less with tolerance ... when Castro came to power, he killed at least 10, 000 people ... in a sense, he was really capable, because he's still in power. So am I, however! And I intend to stay there, and to demonstrate that one can achieve a great many things by the use of force, show even that your old socialism is finished. Old, obsolete, finished ... I achieve more than the Swedes ... Huh! Swedish socialism! It didn't even nationalize forests and water. But I have ... my White Revolution ... is a new original kind of socialism and ... believe me, in Iran we're far more advanced than you and we really have nothing to learn from you.[208]
In an interview with Der Spiegel published on 3 February 1974, Mohammad Reza declared: "I would like you to know that in our case, our actions are not just to take vengeance on the West. As I said, we are going to be a member of your club".[209] In a press conference on March 31, 1974, Mohammad Reza predicted what Iran would be like in 1984, saying:
In the cities, electric cars would replace the gas engines and mass transportation systems would be switched to electricity, monorail over the ground or electric buses. And, furthermore, in the great era of civilization that lies ahead of our people, there will be least two or three holidays a week.[210]
In 1976, Mohammad Reza told the Egyptian journalist Mohamed Hassanein Heikal in an interview: "I want the standard of living in Iran in ten years' time to be exactly on a level with that in Europe today. In twenty years' time we shall be ahead of the United States".[210]
Reflecting his need to have Iran seen as "part of the world" (by which Mohammad Reza meant the western world), all through the 1970s he sponsored conferences in Iran at his expense, with for example in one week in September 1975 the International Literacy Symposium meeting in Persepolis, the International Congress of Philosophy meeting in Mashhad and the International Congress of Mithraic Studies meeting in Tehran.[211] He also sought to hold the 1984 Summer Olympics in Tehran. For most ordinary Iranians, struggling with inflation, poverty, air pollution (Iranian cities were infamous in the 1970s as being amongst the most polluted in the world), having to pay extortion payments to the police who demanded money from even those performing legal jobs such as selling fruits on the street, and daily traffic jams, the Shah's sponsorship of international conferences were just a waste of money and time.[212] Furthermore, conferences on pre-Islamic practices such as the cult of Mithra fuelled religious anxieties.[213] Though Mohammad Reza envisioned the "Great Civilisation" of a modernised Iran whose standard of living would be higher than those of the United States and at the forefront of modern technology, he did not envision any political change, making it clear that Iran would remain an autocracy.[210]
Achievements[edit]
In his "White Revolution" starting in the 1960s, Mohammad Reza made major changes to modernise Iran. He curbed the power of certain ancient elite factions by expropriating large and medium-sized estates for the benefit of more than four million small farmers. He took a number of other major measures, including extending suffrage to women and the participation of workers in factories through shares and other measures. In the 1970s the governmental programme of free-of-charge nourishment for children at school known as "Taghziye Rāyegan" (Persian: تغذیه رایگان) was implemented. Under the Shah's reign, the national Iranian income showed an unprecedented rise for an extended period.
Improvement of the educational system was made through the creation of new elementary schools. In addition, literacy courses were set up in remote villages by the Imperial Iranian Armed Forces, this initiative being called "Sepāh-e Dānesh" (Persian: سپاه دانش) meaning "Army of Knowledge". The Armed Forces were also engaged in infrastructural and other educational projects throughout the country "Sepāh-e Tarvij va Ābādāni" (Persian: سپاه ترویج و آبادانی) as well as in health education and promotion "Sepāh-e Behdāsht" (Persian: سپاه بهداشت). The Shah instituted exams for Islamic theologians to become established clerics. Many Iranian university students were sent to and supported in foreign, especially Western, countries and the Indian subcontinent.
Between 1967 and 1977 the number of universities increased in number from 7 to 22, the number of institutions of advanced learning rose from 47 to 200, and the number of students in higher education soared from 36,742 to 100,000. Iran’s literacy programs were among the most innovative and effective anywhere in the world, so that by 1977 the number of Iranians able to read and write had climbed from just 17 percent to more than 50 percent.[214]
In the field of diplomacy, Iran realised and maintained friendly relations with Western and East European countries as well as the state of Israel and China and became, especially through its close friendship with the United States, more and more a hegemonial power in the Persian Gulf region and the Middle East. The suppression of the communist guerrilla movement in the region of Dhofar in Oman with the help of the Iranian army after a formal request by Sultan Qaboos was widely regarded in this context.
As to infrastructural and technological progress, the Shah continued and developed further the policies introduced by his father. His programmes included projects in technologies such as steel, telecommunications, petrochemical facilities, power plants, dams and the automobile industry. The Aryamehr University of Technology was established as a major new academic institution.[215][216][217]
International cultural cooperation was encouraged and organised, such as the 2,500 year celebration of the Persian Empire and Shiraz Arts Festival. As part of his various financial support programmes in the fields of culture and arts, the Shah, along with King Hussein of Jordan made a donation to the Chinese Muslim Association for the construction of the Taipei Grand Mosque.[218]
Revolution[edit]
The spark[edit]
The overthrow of the Shah came as a surprise to almost all observers.[219][220] The first militant anti-Shah demonstrations of a few hundred started in October 1977, after the death of Khomeini's son Mostafa.[221] On 7 January 1978, an article Iran and Red and Black Colonization was published in the newspaper Ettela'at attacking Ruhollah Khomeini, who was in exile in Iraq at the time; it referred to him as a homosexual, a drug addict, a British spy and claimed he was an Indian, not an Iranian.[222] Khomeini's supporters had brought in audio tapes of his sermons, and Mohammad Reza was angry with one sermon, alleging corruption on his part, and decided to hit back with the article, despite the feeling at the court, SAVAK and Ettela'at editors that the article was an unnecessary provocation that was going to cause trouble.[222] The next day, protests against the article began in the holy city of Qom, a traditional centre of opposition to the House of Pahlavi.[223]
The cancer patient[edit]
Mohammad Reza was diagnosed with cancer in 1974.[224] As it worsened, from the spring of 1978, Mohammad Reza stopped appearing in public, with the official explanation being that he was suffering from a "persistent cold".[225] In May 1978, Mohammad Reza suddenly cancelled a long planned trip to Hungary and Bulgaria and disappeared from view.[225] Mohammad Reza spent the entire summer of 1978 at his resort on the Caspian Sea, where he was treated for his cancer by two of France's most prominent doctors, Jean Bernard and Georges Flandrin.[225] To try to stop his cancer, Bernard and Flandrin had Mohammad Reza take prednisone, an anti-cancer drug that causes depression and impairs thinking.[225] As the country was swept up with nationwide protests and strikes, the court found it impossible to get decisions from Mohammad Reza, as he became utterly passive and indecisive, content to spend hours listlessly staring into space as he rested by the Caspian Sea while the revolution raged.[225] The seclusion of the Shah who normally loved the limelight sparked all sorts of rumors all over Iran about the state of his health and damaged the imperial mystique, as the man who had been presented as a god-like ruler was revealed to be fallible after all.[226] An attempt in July 1978 to deny the rumors of Mohammad Reza's declining health by publishing a crudely doctored photograph in the newspapers of the Emperor and Empress walking on the beach on the Caspian Sea instead further damaged the imperial mystique, as most people realised that what appeared to be two beach clogs on either side of the Shah were merely substitutes inserted for his airbrushed aides, who were holding him up as he now had difficulty walking by himself.[227] In June 1978, Mohammad Reza's French doctors first revealed to the French government how serious his cancer was, and in September 1978 the French government informed the American government that the Shah was dying of cancer; U.S. officials until then had no idea that Mohammad Reza had been diagnosed with terminal cancer in 1974.[224] Mohammad Reza had created a very centralised system in which he was the key decision-maker on all issues, and as the Iranian-American historian Abbas Milani noted, the Shah was mentally crippled in the summer of 1978 owing to his tendency to be indecisive when faced with a crisis, which combined with his cancer and the effects of the anti-cancer drugs made his mood "... increasingly volatile and unpredictable. One day, he was full of verve and optimism and the next day or hour he fell into a catatonic stupor", bringing the entire government to a halt.[228] Milani wrote that the Shah was in 1978 "beset with depression, indecision and paralysis, and his indecision led to the immobilisation of the entire system".[229] The Empress Farah grew so frustrated with her husband that she suggested numerous times that he leave Iran for medical treatment and appoint her regent, saying she would handle the crisis and save the House of Pahlavi, an idea that the macho Mohammad Reza vetoed, saying he did not want Farah to be "Joan of Arc" and it would be too humiliating for him as a man to flee Iran and leave a woman in charge.[229]
Black Friday[edit]
The Shah-centred command structure of the Iranian military, and the lack of training to confront civil unrest, was marked by disaster and bloodshed. There were several instances where army units had opened fire, the most notorious one being the events of 8 September 1978. On this day, which later became known as "Black Friday", thousands had gathered in Tehran's Jaleh Square for a religious demonstration. With people refusing to recognise martial law, the soldiers opened fire, killing and seriously injuring a large number of people. Black Friday played a crucial role in further radicalising the protest movement. The massacre so reduced the chance for reconciliation that Black Friday is referred to as "the point of no return" for the revolution.[230][231][232][233][234][235][236] On 2 October 1978, the Shah declared and granted an amnesty to dissidents living abroad, including Ayatollah Khomeini.[237]
"Things fell apart, the centre cannot hold": the regime falls apart[edit]
By October 1978, strikes were paralysing the country, and in early December a "total of 6 to 9 million"—more than 10% of the country—marched against the Shah throughout Iran.[238] In October 1978, after flying over a huge demonstration in Tehran in his helicopter, Mohammad Reza accused the British ambassador Sir Anthony Parsons and the American ambassador William H. Sullivan of organising the demonstrations, screaming that he was being "betrayed" by the United Kingdom and the United States.[239] The fact that the BBC's journalists tended to be very sympathetic towards the revolution was viewed by most Iranians, including Mohammad Reza, as a sign that Britain was supporting the revolution. This impression turned out to be crucial, as the Iranian people had a very exaggerated idea about Britain's capacity to "direct events" in Iran.[240] In a subsequent internal inquiry, the BBC found many of its more left-wing journalists disliked Mohammad Reza as a "reactionary" force, and sympathised with a revolution seen as "progressive".[241] Mohammad Reza spent much of his time working out various conspiracy theories about who was behind the revolution, with his favourite candidates being some combination of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union.[242] Milani wrote that Mohamad Reza's view of the revolution as a gigantic conspiracy organised by foreign powers suggested that there was nothing wrong with Iran, and the millions of people demonstrating against him were just dupes being used by foreigners, a viewpoint that did not encourage concessions and reforms until it was too late.[229] For much of 1978, Mohammad Reza saw his enemies as "Marxist" revolutionaries rather than Islamists.[239] The Shah had exaggerated ideas about the power of the KGB, which he thought of as omnipotent, and often expressed the view that all of the demonstrations against him had been organised in Moscow, saying only the KGB had the power to bring out thousands of ordinary people to demonstrate.[243] In October 1978, the oil workers went on strike, shutting down the oil industry and with it, Mohammad Reza's principal source of revenue.[244] The Iranian military had no plans in place to deal with such an event, and the strike pushed the regime to the economic brink.[244]
The revolution had attracted support from a broad coalition ranging from secular, left-wing nationalists to Islamists on the right, and Khomeini, who was now based in Paris after being expelled from Iraq, chose to present himself as a moderate able to bring together all the different factions leading the revolution.[245] On 3 November a SAVAK plan to arrest about 1,500 people considered to be leaders of the revolution was submitted to Mohammad Reza, who at first tentatively agreed, but then changed his mind, disregarding not the only plan, but also dismissing its author, Parviz Sabeti.[246] On 5 November 1978, Mohammad Reza went on Iranian television to say "I have heard the voice of your revolution" and promise major reforms.[247] In a major concession to the opposition, on 7 November 1978, Mohammad Reza freed all political prisoners while ordering the arrest of the former prime minister Amir-Abbas Hoveyda and several senior officials of his regime, a move that both emboldened his opponents and demoralised his supporters.[248] On 21 November 1978, the Treasury Secretary of the United States Michael Blumenthal visited Tehran to meet Mohammad Reza and reported back to President Carter, "This man is a ghost", as by now the ravages of his cancer could not longer be concealed.[249] In late December 1978, the Shah learned that many of his generals were making overtures to the revolutionary leaders and the loyalty of the military could not longer be counted upon.[250] In a sign of desperation, the following month Mohammad Reza reached out to the National Front, asking if one of their leaders would be willing to become prime minister.[251]
The Shah was especially interested in having the National Front's Gholam Hossein Sadighi as prime minister.[251] Sadighi had served as interior minister under Mosaddegh, had been imprisoned after the 1953 coup, and had pardoned by Mohammad Reza on the grounds that he was a "patriot".[252] Sadighi remained active in the National Front and had often been harassed by SAVAK, but was willing to serve as prime minister under Mohammad Reza in order to "save" Iran, saying he feared what might come after if the Shah was overthrown.[252] Despite the opposition of the other National Front leaders, Sadighi visited the Niavaran palace several times in December 1978 to discuss the terms under which he might become prime minister, with the main sticking point being that he wanted the Shah not to leave Iran, saying he needed to remain in order to ensure the loyalty of the military.[253] On 7 December 1978, it was announced that President Carter of the U.S., President Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Schmidt of West Germany and Prime Minister Callaghan of the United Kingdom would meet in Guadeloupe on 5 January 1979 to discuss the crisis in Iran.[254] For Mohammad Reza this announcement was the final blow, and he was convinced that the Western leaders were holding the meeting to discuss how best to abandon him.[255]
The end of monarchy[edit]
On 16 January 1979, Mohammad Reza made a contract with Farboud and left Iran at the behest of Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar (a longtime opposition leader himself), who sought to calm the situation.[256] As Mohammad Reza boarded the plane to take him out of Iran, many of the Imperial Guardsmen wept while Bakhtiar did little to hide his disdain and dislike for the Shah.[257] Spontaneous attacks by members of the public on statues of the Pahlavis followed, and "within hours, almost every sign of the Pahlavi dynasty" was destroyed.[258] Bakhtiar dissolved SAVAK, freed all political prisoners, and allowed Ayatollah Khomeini to return to Iran after years in exile. He asked Khomeini to create a Vatican-like state in Qom, promised free elections, and called upon the opposition to help preserve the constitution, proposing a "national unity" government including Khomeini's followers. Khomeini rejected Bakhtiar's demands and appointed his own interim government, with Mehdi Bazargan as prime minister, stating that "I will appoint a state. I will act against this government. With the nation's support, I will appoint a state."[259] In February, pro-Khomeini revolutionary guerrilla and rebel soldiers gained the upper hand in street fighting, and the military announced its neutrality. On the evening of 11 February, the dissolution of the monarchy was complete.
Criticism of reign and causes of his overthrow[edit]
At the Federation of American Scientists, John Pike writes:
In 1978 the deepening opposition to the Shah erupted in widespread demonstrations and rioting. Recognising that even this level of violence had failed to crush the rebellion, the Shah abdicated the Peacock Throne and fled Iran on 16 January 1979. Despite decades of pervasive surveillance by SAVAK, working closely with CIA, the extent of public opposition to the Shah, and his sudden departure, came as a considerable surprise to the US intelligence community and national leadership. As late as 28 September 1978 the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported that the Shah "is expected to remain actively in power over the next ten years."[260]
Explanations for the overthrow of Mohammad Reza include his status as a dictator put in place by a non-Muslim Western power, the United States,[261][262] whose foreign culture was seen as influencing that of Iran. Additional contributing factors included reports of oppression, brutality,[263][264] corruption, and extravagance.[263][265] Basic functional failures of the regime have also been blamed – economic bottlenecks, shortages and inflation; the regime's over-ambitious economic programme;[266] the failure of its security forces to deal with protests and demonstrations;[267] and the overly centralised royal power structure.[268] International policies pursued by the Shah in order to increase national income by remarkable increases in the price of oil through his leading role in the Organization of the Oil Producing Countries (OPEC) have been stressed as a major cause for a shift of Western interests and priorities, and for a reduction of their support for him reflected in a critical position of Western politicians and media, especially of the administration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter regarding the question of human rights in Iran, and in strengthened economic ties between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia in the 1970s.[269]
In October 1971, Mohammad Reza celebrated the twenty-five-hundredth anniversary of the Iranian monarchy; The New York Times reported that $100 million was spent on the celebration.[270] Next to the ancient ruins of Persepolis, the Shah gave orders to build a tent city covering 160 acres (0.65 km2), studded with three huge royal tents and fifty-nine lesser ones arranged in a star-shaped design. French chefs from Maxim's of Paris prepared breast of peacock for royalty and dignitaries from around the world, the buildings were decorated by Maison Jansen (the same firm that helped Jacqueline Kennedy redecorate the White House), the guests ate off Limoges porcelain and drank from Baccarat crystal glasses. This became a major scandal, as the contrast between the dazzling elegance of the celebration and the misery of the nearby villages was so dramatic that no one could ignore it. Months before the festivities, university students went on strike in protest. Indeed, the cost was so sufficiently impressive that the Shah forbade his associates to discuss the actual figures. However he and his supporters argued that the celebrations opened new investments in Iran, improved relationships with the other leaders and nations of the world, and provided greater recognition of Iran.[271][272]
Other actions that are thought to have contributed to his downfall include antagonising formerly apolitical Iranians — especially merchants of the bazaars — with the creation in 1975 of a single party political monopoly (the Rastakhiz Party), with compulsory membership and dues, and general aggressive interference in the political, economic, and religious concerns of people's lives;[273] and the 1976 change from an Islamic calendar to an Imperial calendar, marking the conquest of Babylon by Cyrus as the first day, instead of the migration of Muhammad from Mecca to Medina. This supposed date was designed so that the year 2500 would fall on 1941, the year when his own reign started. Overnight, the year changed from 1355 to 2535.[274] During the extravagant festivities to celebrate the 2500th anniversary, the Shah was quoted as saying at Cyrus's tomb: "Rest in peace, Cyrus, for we are awake".[275]
It has been argued that the White Revolution was "shoddily planned and haphazardly carried out", upsetting the wealthy while not going far enough to provide for the poor or offer greater political freedom.[276] In 1974, Mohammad Reza learned from his French doctors that he was suffering from the cancer that was to kill him six years later.[277] Though this was such a carefully guarded secret that not even the Americans were aware of it (as late as 1977 the CIA submitted a report to President Carter describing the Shah as being in "robust health"), the knowledge of his impending death left Mohammad Reza depressed and passive in his last years, a man no longer capable of acting.[277]
Some achievements of the Shah—such as broadened education—had unintended consequences. While school attendance rose (by 1966 the school attendance of urban seven- to fourteen-year-olds was estimated at 75.8%), Iran's labour market could not absorb a high number of educated youth. In 1966, high school graduates had "a higher rate of unemployment than did the illiterate", and the educated unemployed often supported the revolution.[278]
During his second exile, Mohammad Reza travelled from country to country seeking what he hoped would be temporary residence. First he flew to Aswan, Egypt, where he received a warm and gracious welcome from President Anwar El-Sadat. He later lived in Marrakesh, Morocco as a guest of King Hassan II. Mohammad Reza loved to support royalty during his time as Shah and one of those who benefitted had been Hassan, who received an interest-free loan of $110 million US dollars from his friend.[279] Mohammad Reza expected Hassan to return the favour, but he soon learned Hassan had other motives. Richard Parker, the American ambassador to Morocco reported "The Moroccans believed the Shah was worth about $2 billion, and they wanted to take their share of the loot".[280] After leaving Morocco, Mohammad Reza lived in Paradise Island, in the Bahamas, and in Cuernavaca, Mexico, near Mexico City, as a guest of José López Portillo. Richard Nixon, the former president, visited the Shah in summer 1979 in Mexico.[281] An American doctor, Benjamin Kean who examined Mohammad Reza in Cuernavaca later wrote:
There was no longer any doubt. The atmosphere had changed completely. The Shah's appearance was stunningly worse ... Clearly he had obstructive jaundice. The odds favored gallstones, since his fever, chills and abdominal distress suggested an infection of the biliary tract. Also he had a history of indigestion. Besides the probable obstruction – he now had been deeply jaundiced for six to eight weeks – he was emaciated and suffering from hard tumor nodes in the neck and a swollen spleen, signs that his cancer was worsening, and he had severe anemia and very low white blood counts.[282]
The Shah suffered from gallstones that would require prompt surgery. He was offered treatment in Switzerland, but insisted on treatment in the United States. President Carter did not wish to admit Mohammad Reza to the U.S. but came under pressure from many quarters, with Henry Kissinger phoning Carter to say he would not endorse the SALT II treaty that Carter had just signed with the Soviet Union unless the former Shah was allowed into the United States, reportedly prompting Carter more than once to hang up his phone in rage in the Oval Office and shout "Fuck the Shah!".[283] As many Republicans were attacking the SALT II treaty as an American give-away to the Soviet Union, Carter was anxious to have the endorsement of a Republican elder statesman like Kissinger to fend off this criticism. Mohammad Reza had decided not to tell his Mexican doctors he had cancer, and the Mexican doctors had misdiagnosed his illness as malaria, giving him a regime of anti-malarial drugs that did nothing to treat his cancer, which caused his health to go into rapid decline as he lost 30 pounds.[284] In September 1979, a doctor sent by David Rockefeller reported to the State Department that Mohammad Reza needed to come to the United States for medical treatment, an assessment not shared by Kean, who stated that the proper medical equipment for treating Mohammad Reza's cancer could be found in Mexico and the only problem was the former Shah's unwillingness to tell the Mexicans he had cancer.[285] The State Department warned Carter not to admit the former Shah into the U.S., saying it was likely that the Iranian regime would seize the American embassy in Tehran if that occurred.[286] Milani suggested there was a possible conflict of interest on the part of Rockefeller, noting that his Chase Manhattan Bank had given Iran a $500 million loan under questionable conditions in 1978 (several lawyers had refused to endorse the loan) which placed the money in an account with Chase Manhattan, that the new Islamic republic had been making "substantial withdrawals" from its account with Chase Manhattan, and that Rockefeller wanted Mohammad Reza in the US, knowing full well it was likely to cause the Iranians to storm the U.S. embassy, which in turn would cause the U.S. government to freeze Iranian financial assets in America---such as the Iranian account at Chase Manhattan.[287]
On 22 October 1979, President Jimmy Carter reluctantly allowed the Shah into the United States to undergo surgical treatment at the New York Hospital–Cornell Medical Center. While there, Mohammad Reza used the name of "David D. Newsom", Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs at that time, as his temporary code name, without Newsom's knowledge. The Shah was taken later by US Air Force jet to Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and from there to Wilford Hall Medical Center at Lackland Air Force Base.[288] It was anticipated that his stay in the United States would be short; however, surgical complications ensued, which required six weeks of confinement in the hospital before he recovered. His prolonged stay in the United States was extremely unpopular with the revolutionary movement in Iran, which still resented the United States' overthrow of Prime Minister Mosaddegh and the years of support for the Shah's rule. The Iranian government demanded his return to Iran, but he stayed in the hospital.[289] Mohammad Reza's time in New York was highly uncomfortable; he was under a heavy security detail as every day, Iranian students studying in the United States gathered outside his hospital to shout "Death to the Shah!", a chorus that Mohammad Reza heard.[290] The former Shah was obsessed with watching news from Iran, and was greatly upset at the new order being imposed by the Islamic Republic.[290] Mohammad Reza could no longer walk by this time, and for security reasons had to be moved in his wheelchair under the cover of darkness when he went to the hospital while covered in a blanket, as the chances of his assassination were too great.[290]
There are claims that Reza's admission to the United States resulted in the storming of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran and the kidnapping of American diplomats, military personnel, and intelligence officers, which soon became known as the Iran hostage crisis.[291] In the Shah's memoir, Answer to Historyhe claimed that the United States never provided him any kind of health care and asked him to leave the country.[292] From the time of the storming of the American embassy in Tehran and the taking of the embassy staff as hostages, Mohammad Reza's presence in the United States was viewed by the Carter administration as a stumbling block to the release of the hostages, and as Zonis noted "... he was, in effect, expelled from the country".[293] Mohammad Reza wanted to go back to Mexico, saying he had pleasant memories of Cuernavaca, but was refused.[294] Mexico was a candidate to be a rotating member of the UN Security Council, but needed the vote of Cuba to be admitted, and the Cuban leader Fidel Castro told President José López Portillo that Cuba's vote was conditional on Mexico not accepting the Shah again.[294]
He left the United States on 15 December 1979 and lived for a short time in the Isla Contadora in Panama. This caused riots by Panamanians who objected to the Shah being in their country. General Omar Torrijos, the dictator of Panama kept Mohammad Reza as a virtual prisoner at the Paitilla Medical Center, a hospital condemned by the former Shah's American doctors as "an inadequate and poorly staffed hospital", and in order to hasten his death allowed only Panamanian doctors to treat his cancer.[295] General Torrijos, a populist left-winger had only taken in Mohammad Reza under heavy American pressure, and he made no secret of his dislike of Mohammad Reza, whom he called after meeting him "the saddest man he had ever met".[296] When he first met Mohammad Reza, Torrijos taunted him by telling him "it must be hard to fall off the Peacock Throne into Contadora" and called him a "chupon", a Spanish term meaning an orange that has all the juice squeezed out of it, which is slang for someone who is finished.[296]
Torrijos added to Mohammad Reza's misery by making his chief bodyguard a militantly Marxist sociology professor who spent much time lecturing Mohammad Reza on how he deserved his fate because he been a tool of the "American imperialism" that was oppressing the Third World, and charged Mohammad Reza a monthly rent of $21,000 US dollars, making him pay for all his food and the wages of the 200 National Guardsmen assigned as his bodyguards.[296] The new government in Iran still demanded his and his wife's immediate extradition to Tehran. A short time after Mohammad Reza's arrival in Panama, an Iranian ambassador was dispatched to the Central American nation carrying a 450-page extradition request. That official appeal alarmed both the Shah and his advisors. Whether the Panamanian government would have complied is a matter of speculation amongst historians.[297]
The only consolation for Mohammad Reza during his time in Panama were letters from Princess Soraya saying that she still loved him and wanted to see him one last time before he died.[298] Mohammad Reza in the letters he sent to Paris declared he wanted to see Soraya one last time as well, but said that the Empress Farah could not be present, which presented some complications as Farah was continually by his deathbed.[299]
After that event, the Shah again sought the support of Egyptian president Anwar El-Sadat, who renewed his offer of permanent asylum in Egypt to the ailing monarch. He returned to Egypt in March 1980, where he received urgent medical treatment, including a splenectomy performed by Michael DeBakey.[300] On 28 March 1980, Mohammad Reza's French and American doctors finally performed an operation meant to have been performed in the fall of 1979.[301] Kean recalled:
The operation went beautifully. That night, however, was terrible. The medical team-American, Egyptian, French-was in the pathology lab. The focus was on the Shah's cancerous spleen, grotesquely swollen to 20 times normal. It was one-foot long, literally the size of a football. But I was drawn to the liver tissues that had also been removed. The liver was speckled with white. Malignancy. The cancer had hit the liver. The Shah would soon die ... The tragedy is that a man who should have had the best and easiest medical care had, in many respects, the worst.[302]
By that point, it was arranged by President Sadat that Soraya would quietly visit Mohammad Reza on his deathbed in Egypt without Farah present, but Milani noted the two were "star-crossed lovers" and Mohammad Reza died before Soraya could come to Egypt from her home in Paris.[299]
Mohammad Reza died from complications of Waldenström's macroglobulinemia on 27 July 1980, aged 60. Egyptian President Sadat gave the Shah a state funeral.[303] In addition to members of the Pahlavi family, Anwar Sadat, Richard Nixon and Constantine II of Greece attended the funeral ceremony in Cairo.[304]
Mohammad Reza is buried in the Al Rifa'i Mosque in Cairo, a mosque of great symbolic importance. Also buried there is Farouk of Egypt, Mohammad Reza's former brother-in-law. The tombs lie to the left of the entrance. Years earlier, his father and predecessor, Reza Shah had also initially been buried at the Al Rifa'i Mosque.
In 1969, Mohammad Reza sent one of 73 Apollo 11 Goodwill Messages to NASA for the historic first lunar landing.[305] The message still rests on the lunar surface today. He stated in part, "we pray the Almighty God to guide mankind towards ever increasing success in the establishment of culture, knowledge and human civilisation". The Apollo 11 crew visited Mohammad Reza during a world tour.
Shortly after his overthrow, Mohammad Reza wrote an autobiographical memoir Réponse à l'histoire (Answer to History). It was translated from the original French into English, Persian (Pasokh be Tarikh), and other languages. However, by the time of its publication, the Shah had already died. The book is his personal account of his reign and accomplishments, as well as his perspective on issues related to the Iranian Revolution and Western foreign policy toward Iran. He places some of the blame for the wrongdoings of SAVAK, and the failures of various democratic and social reforms (particularly through the White Revolution), upon Amir Abbas Hoveyda and his administration.
Hussein-Ali Montazeri, who was once the designated successor to Ruhollah Khomeini, said that the Shah did not kill even 10 per cent of what Ruhollah Khomeini's regime had killed.[306] Recently, the Shah's reputation has experienced something of a revival in Iran, with some people looking back on his era as a time when Iran was more prosperous[307][308] and the government less oppressive.[309] Journalist Afshin Molavi reported that some members of the uneducated poor—traditionally core supporters of the revolution that overthrew the Shah—were making remarks such as, "God bless the Shah's soul, the economy was better then", and found that "books about the former Shah (even censored ones) sell briskly", while "books of the Rightly Guided Path sit idle".[310] On 28 October 2016, thousands of people in Iran celebrating Cyrus Day at the Tomb of Cyrus, chanted slogans in support of him, and against the current Islamic regime of Iran and Arabs, and many were subsequently arrested.[311]
Bibliography[edit]
Mohammad Reza published several books in the course of his kingship and two later works after his downfall. Amongst others, these include:
Women's rights[edit]
Under Mohammad Reza's father, the government supported advancements by women against child marriage, polygamy, exclusion from public society, and education segregation. However, independent feminist political groups were shut down and forcibly integrated into one state-created institution, which maintained many paternalistic views. Despite substantial opposition from Shiite religious jurists, the Iranian feminist movement, led by activists such as Fatemah Sayyeh, achieved further advancement under Mohammad Reza. His regime's changes focused on the civil sphere, and private-oriented family law remained restrictive, although the 1967 and 1975 Family Protection Laws attempted to reform this trend.[312] During the reign of Shah, women gained the right to freely choose any profession, for example first female Iranian ministers such as Farrokhroo Parsa and judges such as Shirin Ebadi, while Mehrangiz Dowlatshahi became the first female cabinet member and ambassador of Iran. These activities alienated Islamic traditionalists and hastened the fall of the Shah.
Religious beliefs[edit]
From his mother, Mohammad Reza inherited an almost messianic belief in his own greatness and that God was working in his favour, which explained the often passive and fatalistic attitudes that he displayed as an adult.[313] In 1973, Mohammad Reza told the Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci:
A king who does not need to account to anyone for what he says and does is unavoidably doomed to loneliness. However, I am not entirely alone, because a force others can't perceive accompanies me. My mystical force. Moreover, I receive messages. I have lived with God besides me since I was 5 years old. Since, that is, God sent me those visions.[314]
Mohamed Reza often spoke in public and in private from childhood onward of his belief that God had chosen him for a "divine mission" to transform Iran, as he believed that dreams he had as a child of the Twelve Imams of Shia Islam were all messages from God.[315] In his 1961 book Mission for My CountryMohammad Reza wrote:
From the time I was six or seven, I have felt that perhaps there is a supreme being, who is guiding me. I don't know. Sometimes the thought disturbs me because then, I ask myself, what is my own personality, and am I possessed of free will? Still, I often reflect, if I am driven-or perhaps I should say supported-by another force, there must be a reason.[316]
In his biography of the Shah, Marvin Zonis has argued that Mohammad Reza really believed in these claims of divine support. Shia Islam has no tradition of describing Shahs being favoured with messages from God, very few Shahs had ever claimed that their dreams were divine messages, and most people in the West laughed and snickered at Mohammad Reza's claim that his dreams were messages from God.[317] Reza Khan who was an atheist dismissed these visions as nonsense, and told his son to have more common sense.[318]
Mohammad Reza inherited the wealth built by his father Reza Shah who preceded him as king of Iran and became known as the richest person in Iran during his reign, with his wealth estimated to be higher than 600 million rials[319] and including vast amounts of land and numerous large estates especially in the province of Mazandaran[320] obtained usually at a fraction of their real price.[321] Reza Shah, facing criticism for his wealth, decided to pass on all of his land and wealth to his eldest son Mohammad Reza in exchange for a sugar cube, known in Iran as habbe kardan.[322] However shortly after obtaining the wealth Mohammad Reza was ordered by his father and then king to transfer a million toman ($500,000) to each of his siblings.[323] By 1958 it was estimated that the companies possessed by Mohammad Reza had a value of $157 million (in 1958 USD) with an estimated additional $100 million saved outside Iran.[324] Rumours of his and his family's corruption began to surface which greatly damaged his reputation. This formed one of the reasons for the creation of the Pahlavi Foundation and the distribution of additional land to the people of some 2,000 villages inherited by his father, often at very low and discounted prices.[325] In 1958, using funds from inherited crown estates, Mohammad Reza established the Pahlavi Foundation which functioned as a tax-exempt charity and held all his assets, including 830 villages spanning a total area of 2.5 million hectares.[326] According to Business Insider, Mohammad Reza had set up the organisation "to pursue Iran's charitable interests in the U.S." [327] At its height, the organisation was estimated to be worth $3 billion, however, on numerous occasions, the Pahlavi Foundation was accused of corruption.[328][329] Despite these charges, in his book Answer to HistoryPahlavi affirms that he "never made the slightest profit" out of the Foundation.[330]
In a 1974 interview which was shown in a documentary titled Crisis in IranMohammad Reza told Mike Wallace that the rumours of corruption were "the most unjust thing that I have heard," calling them a "cheap accusation" whilst arguing the allegations were not as serious as those regarding other governments, including that of the United States.[331] In November 1978, after Pahlavi dismissed Prime Minister Jafar Sharif-Emami and appointed a military government, he pledged in a televised address "not to repeat the past mistakes and illegalities, the cruelty and corruption." [332] Despite this, the royal family's wealth can be seen as one of the factors behind the Iranian revolution. This was due to the oil crises of the 1970s which increased inflation resulting in economic austerity measures which made lower class workers more inclined to protest.[333]
Mohammad Reza's wealth remained considerable during his time in exile. While staying in the Bahamas he offered to purchase the island that he was staying on for $425 million (in 1979 USD), however his offer was rejected by the Bahamas which claimed that the island was worth far more. On 17 October 1979, again in exile and perhaps knowing the gravity of his illness, he split up his wealth amongst his family members, giving 20% to Farah, 20% to his eldest son Reza, 15% to Farahnaz, 15% to Leila, 20% to his younger son, in addition to giving 8% to Shahnaz and 2% to his granddaughter Mahnaz Zahedi.[334]
On 14 January 1979, an article titled "Little pain expected in exile for Shah" by The Spokesman Review newspaper found that the Pahlavi dynasty had amassed one of the largest private fortunes in the world; estimated then at well over $1 billion. It also stated that a document submitted to the ministry of justice, in protest of the royal family's activity in many sectors of the nation's economy, detailed the Pahlavis dominating role in the economy of Iran. The list showed that the Pahlavi dynasty had interests in, amongst other things, 17 banks and insurance companies, including a 90 per cent ownership in the nation's third-largest insurance company, 25 metal enterprises, 8 mining companies, 10 building materials companies, including 25 per cent of the largest cement company, 45 construction companies, 43 food companies, and 26 enterprises in trade or commerce, including a share of ownership in almost every major hotel in Iran; the Pahlavis also has major interests in real estate.[335] Mohammad Reza was assigned a personal budget, taken from the treasury, with amounts varying between $43 million and $1 billion per year.[336]
Mohammad Reza was also known for his interest in cars and had a personal collection of 140 classic and sports cars including a Mercedes-Benz 500K Autobahn cruiser, one of only six ever made.[337] The first Maserati 5000 GT was named the Shah of Persiait was built for Mohammad Reza, who had been impressed by the Maserati 3500 and requested Giulio Alfieri, Maserati's chief engineer, to use a modified 5-litre engine from the Maserati 450S on the 3500GT's chassis.[338]
Titles, styles, honours, arms and symbols[edit]
Titles, styles and honours[edit]
Mohammad Reza was Sovereign of many orders in Iran, and received honours and decorations from around the world. Mohammad Reza used the style His Majesty until his imperial coronation in 1967, ascending to the title of Shahanshah, when he adopted the style His Imperial Majesty. Mohammad Reza also held many supplementary titles such as Bozorg Artestaran, a military rank superseding his prior position as Captain. On 15 September 1965, Mohammad Reza was granted the title of Aryamehr ('Light of the Aryans') by an extraordinary session of the joint Houses of Parliament.[339]
Arms[edit]
From 24 April 1926 until his accession, Mohammad Reza's arms notably consisted of two Shahbaz birds in the centre, a common symbol during the Achaemenid period, with the Pahlavi Crown placed above them. Upon his accession, he adopted his father's coat of arms which included a shield composed of the Lion and the Sun symbol in first quarter, the Faravahar in the second quarter, the two-pointed sword of Ali (Zulfiqar) in third quarter and the Simurgh in the fourth quarter. Overall in the centre is a circle depicting Mount Damavand with a rising sun, the symbol of the Pahlavi dynasty. The shield is crowned by the Pahlavi crown and surrounded by the chain of the Order of Pahlavi. Two lions rampant regardant, holding scimitars supports the coat of arms on either side. Under the whole device is the motto: "Mara dad farmud va Khod Davar Ast" ("Justice He bids me do, as He will judge me" or, alternatively, "He gave me power to command, and He is the judge").
 |  |
|---|---|
(1926–1941) | (1941–1980) |
Imperial symbols[edit]
The Pahlavi imperial family employed rich heraldry to symbolise their reign and ancient Persian heritage. An image of the imperial crown was included in every official state document and symbol, from the badges of the armed forces to paper money and coinage. The image of the crown was the centerpiece of the imperial standard of the Shah.
The personal standards consisted of a field of pale blue, the traditional colour of the Iranian imperial family, at the centre of which was placed the heraldic motif of the individual. The Imperial Iranian national flag was placed in the top left quadrant of each standard. The appropriate imperial standard was flown beside the national flag when the individual was present. In 1971, new designs were adopted.[340]
 |  |  |
|---|---|---|
(1926–1941) | (1941–1971) | (1971–1980) |
See also[edit]
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Further reading[edit]
- Andrew Scott Cooper,The Oil Kings: How the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East2011, ISBN 9781439157138
- Yves Bomati, Houchang Nahavandi, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, le dernier shah, 1919–1980620 pages, editions Perrin, Paris,2013, ISBN 2-262-03587-3
- Andrew Scott Cooper,The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran Hardcover – July 19, 2016 ISBN 0805098976
- Abbas Milani. The Shah (Palgrave Macmillan; 2011) 488 pages; scholarly biography
- Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to HistoryStein & Day Pub, 1980, ISBN 0-8128-2755-4.
- Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, The Shah's StoryM. Joseph, 1980, ISBN 0-7181-1944-4
- Farah Pahlavi, An Enduring Love: My Life with the Shah – A MemoirMiramax Books, 2004, ISBN 1-4013-5209-X.
- Stephen Kinzer, All The Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East TerrorJohn Wiley & Sons, 2003, ISBN 0-471-26517-9
- William Shawcross, The Shah's last ride: The death of an allyTouchstone, 1989, ISBN 0-671-68745-X.
- Ardeshir Zahedi, The Memoirs of Ardeshir Zahedi IBEX, 2005, ISBN 1-58814-038-5.
- Amin Saikal The Rise and Fall of the Shah 1941–1979 Angus and Robertson (Princeton University Press) ISBN 0-207-14412-5
- David Harris, "The Crisis: the President, the Prophet, and the Shah—1979 and the Coming of Militant Islam" New York: Little, Brown &Co, 2004. ISBN 0-316-32394-2.
- Kapuściński, Ryszard (1982). Shah of Shahs. Vinage. ISBN 0-679-73801-0
- Ali M. Ansari, Modern Iran since 1921 ISBN 0-582-35685-7
- Ahmad Ali Massoud Ansari, Me and the Pahlavis, 1992
- History of Iran, a short account of the 1953 coup – IranChamber.com
External links[edit]
- Decadence and Downfall: The Shah of Iran's Ultimate Party at BBC Programmes – Storyville 2015–2016
- Liberation on YouTube, a Major Motion Picture about the Shah of Iran
- IranNegah.com, video archive of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
- I Knew the Shah on YouTube
- Interview with Mike Wallace on YouTube
- Iranian.com, ISNA interview with Dr. Mahmood Kashani (in Persian)
- Iranian.com, Mosaddeq saved the Shah, by Fereydoun Hoveyda
- NYtimes.com, James Risen: Secrets of History: The C.I.A. in Iran – A special report.; How a Plot Convulsed Iran in '53 (and in '79) The New York Times16 April 2000.
- Stephen Fleischman. CommonDreams.org, Shah knew what he was talking about: Oil is too valuable to burn, 29 November 2005.
- Roger Scruton. FortFreedom.org, In Memory of Iran, Roger Scruton, from 'Untimely tracts' (NY: St. Martin's Press, 1987), pp. 190–1
- PayVand.com, Brzezinski's role in overthrow of the Shah, Payvand News, 10 March 2006.
- Iranian.com, 'Free elections in 1979, my last audience with the Shah', Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Iranian
- Newspaper clippings about Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in the 20th Century Press Archives of the German National Library of Economics (ZBW)
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